United States v. Rahimi
Docket: 22-915
Opinion Date: June 21, 2024
Judge: John G. Roberts, Jr.
Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Family Law
In December 2019, Zackey Rahimi, the respondent, had a violent altercation with his girlfriend, C. M., who is also the mother of his child. Rahimi grabbed C. M., dragged her back to his car, and shoved her in, causing her to hit her head. When a bystander witnessed the incident, Rahimi retrieved a gun from his car. C. M. managed to escape, and Rahimi fired his gun, though it is unclear whether he was aiming at C. M. or the witness. Following this incident, C. M. sought a restraining order against Rahimi, which was granted by a state court in Texas. The order included a finding that Rahimi had committed “family violence” and posed “a credible threat” to the “physical safety” of C. M. or their child. The order also suspended Rahimi’s gun license for two years. Despite the order, Rahimi violated it by approaching C. M.’s home and contacting her through social media. He was later charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for threatening another woman with a gun.
Rahimi was indicted for possessing a firearm while subject to a domestic violence restraining order, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(8). Rahimi moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that Section 922(g)(8) violated his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The District Court denied his motion, and Rahimi pleaded guilty. On appeal, he again raised his Second Amendment challenge, which was denied. Rahimi petitioned for rehearing en banc.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that when a restraining order contains a finding that an individual poses a credible threat to the physical safety of an intimate partner, that individual may—consistent with the Second Amendment—be banned from possessing firearms while the order is in effect. The Court found that since the founding, the nation's firearm laws have included provisions preventing individuals who threaten physical harm to others from misusing firearms. As applied to the facts of this case, Section 922(g)(8) fits comfortably within this tradition. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/602/22-915/?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2024-06-22-us-supreme-court-3dacba2669&utm_content=text-case-title-2
USA V. STACKHOUSE
Docket: 22-30177
Opinion Date: June 27, 2024
Judge: Berzon
Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
The case involves Angelo Corey Stackhouse, who was convicted of kidnapping a minor and transporting a person across state lines with the intent to engage in illegal sexual activity. Stackhouse kidnapped a 10-year-old girl, using a cellphone during the crime, and transported a 19-year-old woman from Montana to Denver, where he sexually assaulted her.
Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Montana convicted Stackhouse on all seven charges. He appealed his convictions for kidnapping a person under the age of 18 using a means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, and for the transportation of a person across state lines with intent to engage in illegal sexual activity.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed Stackhouse’s convictions. The court held that the application of the federal kidnapping statute to an intrastate kidnapping is constitutional where the defendant uses a cellphone—an instrumentality of interstate commerce—in furtherance of the offense. The court also held that the government presented sufficient evidence of Stackhouse’s intent to commit sexual assault when he transported the victim of his assault across state lines. The court concluded that the application of the federal kidnapping statute to an intrastate kidnapping is constitutional where the defendant uses a cellphone in furtherance of the offense, and that Stackhouse’s actions leading up to and during the trip to Denver established that he had the intent to commit illegal sexual activity when he transported the victim interstate.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-30177/22-30177-2024-06-27.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2024-06-28-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-69fcf5134b&utm_content=text-case-read-more-2
City of Grants Pass, Oregon v. Johnson
Opinion: June 28, 2024
Summary: Long story short, states and cities can enforce laws that impact homelessness even if there is not adequate shelter space and that is not a violation of the 8th Amendment of cruel and unusual punishment. The US Supreme Court reversed the 9th Circuit decision and remanded Grants Pass back to the 9th for further proceedings consistent with the decision. For now this does away with the requirement for law enforcement to confirm shelter space before enforcing laws against activities such as sitting, lying or sleeping. It does give the 9th another crack at the issue if they can formulate something that restricts enforcement and fit it within this decision. So if things change in anyway way I will let you know, but for now enforcement of all misdemeanor laws are good without the worry of first confirming available shelter space.
Highlights:
Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna
Docket: 20-1539
Opinion Date: October 18, 2021
Judge: Per Curiam
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Union City, California officer Rivas-Villegas responded to a 911 call reporting that a woman and her children were barricaded in a room for fear that Cortesluna, the woman’s boyfriend, was going to hurt them. After confirming that the family had no means of escape, Rivas-Villegas and other officers commanded Cortesluna outside and onto the ground. Officers saw a knife in Cortesluna’s pocket. While Rivas-Villegas and another officer were removing the knife and handcuffing Cortesluna, Rivas-Villegas briefly placed his knee on the side of Cortesluna’s back. Cortesluna sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. Rivas-Villegas is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly established law. Even assuming that controlling Circuit precedent clearly established the law for purposes of section 1983, Ninth Circuit precedent did not give Rivas-Villegas fair notice that he was using excessive force. This is not an obvious case. The officers, in this case, were responding to a serious alleged incident of domestic violence possibly involving a chainsaw and Cortesluna had a knife protruding from his pocket for which he had just previously appeared to reach. Cortesluna does not dispute, that Rivas-Villegas placed his knee on Cortesluna for no more than eight seconds and only on the side of his back near the knife that officers were in the process of retrieving.
Publication: supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/595/20-1539/?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2021-10-19-us-supreme-court-539701507f&utm_content=text-case-read-more-2
City of Tahlequah v. Bond
Docket: 20-1668
Opinion Date: October 18, 2021
Judge: Per Curiam
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Rollice’s ex-wife called 911. Rollice was in her garage, intoxicated, and would not leave. Three officers responded to the call and spoke with Rollice through the garage’s doorway. Rollice began fidgeting with something in his hands; he appeared nervous. Rollice refused a request for a pat-down. Police body-camera video captured Rollice conversing with the officers as he turned around and walked toward the back of the garage where his tools were hanging. No officer was within six feet of Rollice. The officers state that they ordered Rollice to stop. Rollice kept walking, grabbed a hammer, and turned toward the officers, grasping the hammer's handle with both hands and pulling it up to shoulder level. The officers backed up, drawing their guns. They yelled at Rollice to drop the hammer. Rollice took steps toward Officer Girdner, raised the hammer behind his head, and took a stance as if he was about to throw the hammer or charge at the officers. Two officers fired their weapons, killing Rollice. Rollice’s estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit. The officers did not violate any clearly established law and are shielded by qualified immunity. None of the decisions cited by the Tenth Circuit established that the officers’ conduct was unlawful. Officers engaged in a conversation with Rollice, followed him into a garage at a distance, and did not yell until after he picked up a hammer. Precedent did not “clearly establish” that their conduct was reckless or that their ultimate use of force was unlawful.
Publication: supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/595/20-1668/?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2021-10-19-us-supreme-court-539701507f&utm_content=text-case-read-more-1
Jim v. State
Citation: 137 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 57
Opinion Date: September 23, 2021
Judge: Kristina Pickering
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence recovered during a warrantless inventory search of his vehicle, holding that the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement of the United States and Nevada Constitutions applied in this case. Following a lawful stop and arrest of Defendant, a police officer performed a warrantless inventory search of Defendant's vehicle that produced no formal inventory. The officer, however, observed contraband during the search, leading to criminal charged being filed against Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, alleging that the evidence recovered from the vehicle was the product and fruit of an illegal search. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the evidence was validly discovered under the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement applied because the officer was legally present in the vehicle at the time he observed the contraband.
Publication: https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2021/81545.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2021-09-27-supreme-court-of-nevada-3169a80da6&utm_content=text-case-read-more-2
Caniglia v. Strom
Docket: 20-157
Opinion Date: May 17, 2021
Judge: Clarence Thomas
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
During an argument with his wife, Caniglia placed a handgun on a table and asked his wife to “shoot [him] and get it over with.” His wife left and spent the night at a hotel. The next morning, unable to reach her husband by phone, she called the police to request a welfare check. Officers encountered Caniglia on the porch of his home and called an ambulance, believing that Caniglia posed a risk to himself or others. Caniglia agreed to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation if the officers would not confiscate his firearms. After Caniglia left, the officers located and seized his weapons. Caniglia sued, claiming that the officers had violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The First Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers, extrapolating from the Supreme Court’s “Cady” decision a theory that the officers’ removal of Caniglia and his firearms from his home was justified by a “community caretaking exception” to the warrant requirement. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated. Cady held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment in light of the officers’ “community caretaking functions.” Searches of vehicles and homes are constitutionally different; the core of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee is the right of a person to retreat into his home and “free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”
Decision: supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/593/20-157/?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2021-05-18-us-supreme-court-878d1b0eee&utm_content=text-case-read-more-3
Torres v. Madrid, March 25, 2021
Matter: Seizure of Person by Force
Summary: In this decision, the Supreme Court defines what constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure by force. This new "physical force with intent to seize" definition of seizure will open the door for more civil lawsuits against police officers at a time when qualified immunity is under threat.
There are two ways to effect a seizure - application of physical force, however slight, or a show of authority. If, in a show of authority, the subject does not yield, he is not seized.
In this case, officers attempted to serve a warrant. A female fled and stole a vehicle in fleeing. She was shot during the incident. She was captured after a pursuit and was provided appropriate medical care. She sued, alleging a Fourth Amendment Violation. She lost in both District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals. Supreme Court heard the matter vacated the 10th Circuit's decision. The Supreme Court wrote, "... the application of physical force to the body of a person with the intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the force does not succeed in subduing the person."
Takeaway: 1) the mere physical touch of the person (in this case the bullet) is an arrest, not an attempted arrest; 2) a seizure by force lasts only as long as the application of force; 3) There are two methods of arrest - application of force and show of authority; 4) force can be applied from a distance (a bullet); 5) A seizure requires a use of force and the intent to restrain; 6) Does the conduct objectively manifest an intent to restrain; 7) The amount of force used is pertinent in assessing the objective intent; 8) The seizure does not depend on the subjective beliefs of the person being seized; 9) Seizure by acquisition of control involves submission to authority.
Video: www.youtube.com/watch?v=GfaVT6myqA8
Docket: 22-915
Opinion Date: June 21, 2024
Judge: John G. Roberts, Jr.
Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Family Law
In December 2019, Zackey Rahimi, the respondent, had a violent altercation with his girlfriend, C. M., who is also the mother of his child. Rahimi grabbed C. M., dragged her back to his car, and shoved her in, causing her to hit her head. When a bystander witnessed the incident, Rahimi retrieved a gun from his car. C. M. managed to escape, and Rahimi fired his gun, though it is unclear whether he was aiming at C. M. or the witness. Following this incident, C. M. sought a restraining order against Rahimi, which was granted by a state court in Texas. The order included a finding that Rahimi had committed “family violence” and posed “a credible threat” to the “physical safety” of C. M. or their child. The order also suspended Rahimi’s gun license for two years. Despite the order, Rahimi violated it by approaching C. M.’s home and contacting her through social media. He was later charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for threatening another woman with a gun.
Rahimi was indicted for possessing a firearm while subject to a domestic violence restraining order, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(8). Rahimi moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that Section 922(g)(8) violated his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The District Court denied his motion, and Rahimi pleaded guilty. On appeal, he again raised his Second Amendment challenge, which was denied. Rahimi petitioned for rehearing en banc.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that when a restraining order contains a finding that an individual poses a credible threat to the physical safety of an intimate partner, that individual may—consistent with the Second Amendment—be banned from possessing firearms while the order is in effect. The Court found that since the founding, the nation's firearm laws have included provisions preventing individuals who threaten physical harm to others from misusing firearms. As applied to the facts of this case, Section 922(g)(8) fits comfortably within this tradition. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/602/22-915/?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2024-06-22-us-supreme-court-3dacba2669&utm_content=text-case-title-2
USA V. STACKHOUSE
Docket: 22-30177
Opinion Date: June 27, 2024
Judge: Berzon
Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
The case involves Angelo Corey Stackhouse, who was convicted of kidnapping a minor and transporting a person across state lines with the intent to engage in illegal sexual activity. Stackhouse kidnapped a 10-year-old girl, using a cellphone during the crime, and transported a 19-year-old woman from Montana to Denver, where he sexually assaulted her.
Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Montana convicted Stackhouse on all seven charges. He appealed his convictions for kidnapping a person under the age of 18 using a means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, and for the transportation of a person across state lines with intent to engage in illegal sexual activity.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed Stackhouse’s convictions. The court held that the application of the federal kidnapping statute to an intrastate kidnapping is constitutional where the defendant uses a cellphone—an instrumentality of interstate commerce—in furtherance of the offense. The court also held that the government presented sufficient evidence of Stackhouse’s intent to commit sexual assault when he transported the victim of his assault across state lines. The court concluded that the application of the federal kidnapping statute to an intrastate kidnapping is constitutional where the defendant uses a cellphone in furtherance of the offense, and that Stackhouse’s actions leading up to and during the trip to Denver established that he had the intent to commit illegal sexual activity when he transported the victim interstate.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-30177/22-30177-2024-06-27.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2024-06-28-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-69fcf5134b&utm_content=text-case-read-more-2
City of Grants Pass, Oregon v. Johnson
Opinion: June 28, 2024
Summary: Long story short, states and cities can enforce laws that impact homelessness even if there is not adequate shelter space and that is not a violation of the 8th Amendment of cruel and unusual punishment. The US Supreme Court reversed the 9th Circuit decision and remanded Grants Pass back to the 9th for further proceedings consistent with the decision. For now this does away with the requirement for law enforcement to confirm shelter space before enforcing laws against activities such as sitting, lying or sleeping. It does give the 9th another crack at the issue if they can formulate something that restricts enforcement and fit it within this decision. So if things change in anyway way I will let you know, but for now enforcement of all misdemeanor laws are good without the worry of first confirming available shelter space.
Highlights:
- Not cruel and unusual and cities and states across the country have long employed similar punishments for similar offenses.
- "Grants Pass's camping ordinances do not criminalize status. The public camping laws prohibit actions undertaken by any person, regardless of status. It makes no difference whether the charged defendant is currently a person experiencing homelessness, a backpacker on vacation, or a student who abandons his dorm room to camp out in protest on the lawn of a municipal building."
- Court did not extend the "involuntary" acts argument to homelessness.
- 9th Circuit rules have provided confusion and they have interfered with the "essential considerations of federalism," by taking from the people and their elected leaders difficult questions traditionally "thought to be their province."
- A handful of federal judges cannot being to "match" the collective wisdom the American people posses in deciding "how best to handle" a pressing social question like homelessness.
Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna
Docket: 20-1539
Opinion Date: October 18, 2021
Judge: Per Curiam
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Union City, California officer Rivas-Villegas responded to a 911 call reporting that a woman and her children were barricaded in a room for fear that Cortesluna, the woman’s boyfriend, was going to hurt them. After confirming that the family had no means of escape, Rivas-Villegas and other officers commanded Cortesluna outside and onto the ground. Officers saw a knife in Cortesluna’s pocket. While Rivas-Villegas and another officer were removing the knife and handcuffing Cortesluna, Rivas-Villegas briefly placed his knee on the side of Cortesluna’s back. Cortesluna sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. Rivas-Villegas is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly established law. Even assuming that controlling Circuit precedent clearly established the law for purposes of section 1983, Ninth Circuit precedent did not give Rivas-Villegas fair notice that he was using excessive force. This is not an obvious case. The officers, in this case, were responding to a serious alleged incident of domestic violence possibly involving a chainsaw and Cortesluna had a knife protruding from his pocket for which he had just previously appeared to reach. Cortesluna does not dispute, that Rivas-Villegas placed his knee on Cortesluna for no more than eight seconds and only on the side of his back near the knife that officers were in the process of retrieving.
Publication: supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/595/20-1539/?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2021-10-19-us-supreme-court-539701507f&utm_content=text-case-read-more-2
City of Tahlequah v. Bond
Docket: 20-1668
Opinion Date: October 18, 2021
Judge: Per Curiam
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Rollice’s ex-wife called 911. Rollice was in her garage, intoxicated, and would not leave. Three officers responded to the call and spoke with Rollice through the garage’s doorway. Rollice began fidgeting with something in his hands; he appeared nervous. Rollice refused a request for a pat-down. Police body-camera video captured Rollice conversing with the officers as he turned around and walked toward the back of the garage where his tools were hanging. No officer was within six feet of Rollice. The officers state that they ordered Rollice to stop. Rollice kept walking, grabbed a hammer, and turned toward the officers, grasping the hammer's handle with both hands and pulling it up to shoulder level. The officers backed up, drawing their guns. They yelled at Rollice to drop the hammer. Rollice took steps toward Officer Girdner, raised the hammer behind his head, and took a stance as if he was about to throw the hammer or charge at the officers. Two officers fired their weapons, killing Rollice. Rollice’s estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit. The officers did not violate any clearly established law and are shielded by qualified immunity. None of the decisions cited by the Tenth Circuit established that the officers’ conduct was unlawful. Officers engaged in a conversation with Rollice, followed him into a garage at a distance, and did not yell until after he picked up a hammer. Precedent did not “clearly establish” that their conduct was reckless or that their ultimate use of force was unlawful.
Publication: supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/595/20-1668/?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2021-10-19-us-supreme-court-539701507f&utm_content=text-case-read-more-1
Jim v. State
Citation: 137 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 57
Opinion Date: September 23, 2021
Judge: Kristina Pickering
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence recovered during a warrantless inventory search of his vehicle, holding that the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement of the United States and Nevada Constitutions applied in this case. Following a lawful stop and arrest of Defendant, a police officer performed a warrantless inventory search of Defendant's vehicle that produced no formal inventory. The officer, however, observed contraband during the search, leading to criminal charged being filed against Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, alleging that the evidence recovered from the vehicle was the product and fruit of an illegal search. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the evidence was validly discovered under the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement applied because the officer was legally present in the vehicle at the time he observed the contraband.
Publication: https://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2021/81545.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2021-09-27-supreme-court-of-nevada-3169a80da6&utm_content=text-case-read-more-2
Caniglia v. Strom
Docket: 20-157
Opinion Date: May 17, 2021
Judge: Clarence Thomas
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
During an argument with his wife, Caniglia placed a handgun on a table and asked his wife to “shoot [him] and get it over with.” His wife left and spent the night at a hotel. The next morning, unable to reach her husband by phone, she called the police to request a welfare check. Officers encountered Caniglia on the porch of his home and called an ambulance, believing that Caniglia posed a risk to himself or others. Caniglia agreed to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation if the officers would not confiscate his firearms. After Caniglia left, the officers located and seized his weapons. Caniglia sued, claiming that the officers had violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The First Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers, extrapolating from the Supreme Court’s “Cady” decision a theory that the officers’ removal of Caniglia and his firearms from his home was justified by a “community caretaking exception” to the warrant requirement. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated. Cady held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment in light of the officers’ “community caretaking functions.” Searches of vehicles and homes are constitutionally different; the core of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee is the right of a person to retreat into his home and “free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”
Decision: supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/593/20-157/?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2021-05-18-us-supreme-court-878d1b0eee&utm_content=text-case-read-more-3
Torres v. Madrid, March 25, 2021
Matter: Seizure of Person by Force
Summary: In this decision, the Supreme Court defines what constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure by force. This new "physical force with intent to seize" definition of seizure will open the door for more civil lawsuits against police officers at a time when qualified immunity is under threat.
There are two ways to effect a seizure - application of physical force, however slight, or a show of authority. If, in a show of authority, the subject does not yield, he is not seized.
In this case, officers attempted to serve a warrant. A female fled and stole a vehicle in fleeing. She was shot during the incident. She was captured after a pursuit and was provided appropriate medical care. She sued, alleging a Fourth Amendment Violation. She lost in both District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals. Supreme Court heard the matter vacated the 10th Circuit's decision. The Supreme Court wrote, "... the application of physical force to the body of a person with the intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the force does not succeed in subduing the person."
Takeaway: 1) the mere physical touch of the person (in this case the bullet) is an arrest, not an attempted arrest; 2) a seizure by force lasts only as long as the application of force; 3) There are two methods of arrest - application of force and show of authority; 4) force can be applied from a distance (a bullet); 5) A seizure requires a use of force and the intent to restrain; 6) Does the conduct objectively manifest an intent to restrain; 7) The amount of force used is pertinent in assessing the objective intent; 8) The seizure does not depend on the subjective beliefs of the person being seized; 9) Seizure by acquisition of control involves submission to authority.
Video: www.youtube.com/watch?v=GfaVT6myqA8