Spencer v. Pew
Docket: 21-15521
Opinion Date: September 16, 2024
Judge: Collins
Areas of Law: Civil Rights
The case involves a plaintiff who alleged that four law enforcement officers used excessive force during his arrest. The incident occurred on March 21, 2018, in Mesa, Arizona. The plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle that was pulled over for an unsafe traffic maneuver. During the stop, the plaintiff provided a false name and was asked to step out of the vehicle. When he did, he pushed one of the officers, leading to a struggle during which he was repeatedly punched, kicked, and tasered. The officers eventually handcuffed him using two linked sets of handcuffs. After being handcuffed, the plaintiff claimed that one officer continued to kneel on his upper back and neck, making it difficult for him to breathe.
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, concluding that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the officers' use of force was not clearly established as unlawful under existing precedent. The court also noted that one of the officers did not use any force and was focused on another individual, thus granting summary judgment on the merits for that officer.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's grant of qualified immunity for the officers concerning the force used up to the point of handcuffing, as there was no clearly established law prohibiting their actions. However, the court reversed the grant of qualified immunity for the officer who continued to kneel on the plaintiff's back and neck after he was handcuffed, finding that this conduct violated clearly established law. The court remanded the case for further proceedings regarding this officer and affirmed the summary judgment for the other officers.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-15521/21-15521-2024-09-16.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2024-09-17-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-4893d88f03&utm_content=text-case-read-more-3
Chong v. United States
Docket: 23-55140
Opinion Date: August 14, 2024
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics
A Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputy entered the curtilage of Harson Chong’s home without a warrant, leading to the discovery of drugs, guns, and money. Chong and Tac Tran, who was present at the home, were subsequently charged with federal drug and gun offenses. They claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because their attorneys did not object to the search on Fourth Amendment grounds.
The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially denied their suppression motions, ruling the search justified by the parole-search exception. However, after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Grandberry, the district court reversed, finding insufficient probable cause that Tran resided at Chong’s home. Despite this, the court upheld the search based on exigent circumstances. Chong and Tran were convicted, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. They then filed post-conviction motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied, finding no ineffective assistance of counsel.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the deputy’s entry onto the curtilage without a warrant, consent, or exigency was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court found Chong’s counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress the evidence, as the search was clearly unlawful. However, Tran lacked standing to challenge the search, as he did not reside at Chong’s home and was merely a visitor. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Chong’s § 2255 motion and remanded for relief, but affirmed the denial of Tran’s motion.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-55140/23-55140-2024-08-14.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2024-08-15-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-df24543fe0&utm_content=text-case-read-more-2
United States V. Ramirez
Docket: 22-50045
Opinion Date: April 18, 2024
Judge: Lee
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law
The case revolves around Victor Ramirez, who was pulled over by police officers for traffic violations. Recognizing Ramirez as a gang member from a previous encounter, one of the officers asked him about his parole status. Ramirez confirmed he was on parole for a firearm-related offense. During the stop, the officers discovered a loaded firearm in Ramirez's car. Ramirez was subsequently indicted for possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon.
Ramirez moved to suppress the gun and ammunition, arguing that the officers unreasonably prolonged the stop by asking about his parole status, which he claimed was unrelated to the traffic stop. The district court denied Ramirez's motion to suppress, and Ramirez pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that asking about parole status during a traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment as it reasonably relates to the officer's safety and imposes a negligible burden. The court also remanded the case in part so that the district court could correct the written judgment to conform it to the oral pronouncement of sentence.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-50045/22-50045-2024-04-18.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2024-04-19-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-00b6f4a18b&utm_content=text-case-read-more-2
USA V. PARKINS
Docket: 22-50186
Opinion Date: February 14, 2024
Judge: Owens
Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
A man named Brett Wayne Parkins was convicted of aiming a laser pointer at a police helicopter. Police officers searched Parkins's apartment without a warrant after obtaining consent from his girlfriend. Parkins, who was present but not at the doorway of his apartment, verbally objected to the search. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that under the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must be physically present and expressly refuse consent to nullify a co-tenant’s consent to a warrantless search. The court clarified that physical presence does not require the defendant to stand at the doorway — presence on the premises, including its immediate vicinity, is sufficient. The court ruled that Parkins was physically present on the premises and had expressly refused consent, so the search of his apartment violated his Fourth Amendment rights. However, the court upheld the district court's denial of Parkins's motion to suppress his pre-arrest and post-arrest statements because Parkins was not subject to interrogation for his pre-arrest statements and his post-arrest statements at the police station were not a product of the unlawful search of his apartment. The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-50186/22-50186-2024-02-14.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2024-02-15-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-71bed85d82&utm_content=text-case-read-more-2
FREDRICK WAID, ET AL V. COUNTY OF LYON, ET AL
Docket: 22-15382
Opinion Date: November 21, 2023
Judge: R. Nelson
Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Officers Timothy Wright and Brett Willey responded to a domestic violence call where they shot and killed Robert Anderson. Anderson’s estate and family sued Wright, Willey, and the County of Lyon under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Nevada law. Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted qualified immunity to the officers on the Section 1983 claims.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment excessive force claim because Plaintiffs’ rights were not clearly established. First, it was not obvious that defendants were constitutionally precluded from firing given that they were responding to an active domestic violence situation, lacked the benefit of having time to fully assess the circumstances, and needed to make split-second decisions as they were being charged. Second, Plaintiffs failed to show controlling authorities (or a consensus of persuasive ones) that would have put every reasonable officer on notice that defendants’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Distinguishing this case from other cases, the panel noted that Anderson was in a narrow hall and rapidly approaching the officers, with no barrier between them. He could have accessed the officers’ weapons at any time or otherwise harmed them. Further, if the officers took the option to retreat to the house’s entryway, they would have left Jennifer Anderson—for whom they had just called an ambulance—alone with her husband or risked injury themselves if Anderson obtained a weapon from somewhere in his home.
FREDRICK WAID, ET AL V. COUNTY OF LYON, ET AL, No. 22-15382 (9th Cir. 2023) :: Justia
BURT CAMENZIND V. CALIFORNIA EXPOSITION AND STATE FAIR, ET AL
Docket: 22-15931
Opinion Date: October 31, 2023
Judge: Sanchez
Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Officers told Plaintiff that he could distribute his tokens in designated zones, referred to as Free Speech Zones, outside the entry gates but not inside the festival itself. Plaintiff nevertheless purchased a ticket, entered the festival, began handing out tokens, and was subsequently ejected. He brought suit alleging that the Cal Expo fairgrounds, in their entirety, constitute a traditional “public forum,” analogous to a public park, thereby entitling his speech to the most robust constitutional protections.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants. The panel first held that the enclosed, ticketed portion of the fairgrounds constituted a nonpublic forum under the United States Constitution and the California Speech Clause. The space did not permit free access, its boundaries were clearly delineated by a fence, and no evidence suggested that access had previously been granted as a matter of course. The panel further noted that California courts have drawn distinctions between ticketed and unticketed portions of venues, and Plaintiff pointed to no case holding that an enclosed area with a paid-entry requirement constitutes a public forum. The panel determined that it need not decide whether the area outside the fence was a public forum under the First Amendment because the California Speech Clause provided independent support for Plaintiff’s argument that it was indeed such a forum, albeit subject to reasonable restrictions on speech. The panel concluded that the Free Speech Zones in the exterior fairgrounds were a valid regulation of the time, place, and manner of Plaintiff’s speech. The guidelines on distributing literature in the enclosed area were likewise permissible.
BURT CAMENZIND V. CALIFORNIA EXPOSITION AND STATE FAIR, ET AL, No. 22-15931 (9th Cir. 2023) :: Justia
STEPHEN HILL, ET AL V. CITY OF FOUNTAIN VALLEY, ET AL
Docket: 21-55867
Opinion Date: June 1, 2023
Judge: Lee
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
At around nine o’clock in the evening, a concerned citizen called 911 to report a Ford Mustang darting erratically in the streets. Behind the wheel was a young white male, along with a blindfolded female in the car. With the aid of the car’s license plate number provided by the caller, Fountain Valley police officers figured out the home address of the driver and raced to that house. But this was not an ongoing kidnapping. In reality, the driver was taking his wife for a “surprise” anniversary dinner. And his parents would soon experience a surprise of their own as the police officers descended upon the home that they shared with their son. Before this mix-up could be cleared, the police officers ordered the Plaintiffs out of their home for obstructing the police and pushed the father to the ground as they handcuffed him. The Hills later sued, alleging (among other things) violations of their Fourth Amendment rights against warrantless arrests and excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment for police officers.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that the police officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure when the officers ordered them to exit the home or face arrest for obstruction. The officers never seized Plaintiffs, who did not submit to the officers’ demand to leave the home. They, therefore, could not claim that they were unlawfully arrested. The panel next held that while the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for obstruction of justice, they were nevertheless shielded by qualified immunity.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-55867/21-55867-2023-06-01.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2023-06-02-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-1d09d1d5cd&utm_content=text-case-read-more-2
FRANCISCO DUARTE, ET AL V. CITY OF STOCKTON, ET AL
Docket: 21-16929
Opinion Date: February 16, 2023
Judge: Cardone
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Plaintiff pled “no contest” or “nolo contendere” to willfully resisting, obstructing, and delaying a peace officer in violation of section 148(a)(1) of the California Penal Code. Although Plaintiff entered the equivalent of a guilty plea, the state court never entered an order finding him guilty of the charge to which he pleaded. Instead, the court ordered that its acceptance of Plaintiff’s plea would be “held in abeyance,” pending his completion of ten hours of community service and obedience of all laws. After the six months of abeyance elapsed, the charges against Plaintiff were “dismissed” in the “interest of justice” on the prosecutor’s motion. Plaintiff brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court held that Plaintiff’s false arrest and excessive force claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s false arrest and municipal liability claims, as well as the district court’s adverse summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, and remanded for further proceedings. The panel held that the Heck bar does not apply in a situation where criminal charges are dismissed after entry of a plea that was held in abeyance pending the defendant’s compliance with certain conditions. The panel further held that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s municipal liability claims against the City of Stockton and Stockton Police Department. Longstanding precedent establishes that both California municipalities and police departments are “persons” amenable to suit under Section 1983.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-16929/21-16929-2023-02-16.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2023-02-17-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-e68cc0988c&utm_content=text-case-read-more-1
Notes: There is a case called Heck v. Humphrey that prohibits a civil lawsuit if there was a criminal conviction and that civil lawsuit attacks the very facts that the person was convicted of. However, as you can see from the 9th Circuit that if someone gets at defer and dismiss and they even plead to the charge it does not prohibit a civil rights action after it's been dismissed. What does this mean for you... You cannot control what the prosecution will do with their cases, but if ever asked if you are good with a defer and dismiss you need to review that case and if for some reason you had to go hands on with a suspect you can say that you do not support this type of resolution.
PAULETTE SMITH V. EDWARD AGDEPPA, ET AL
Docket: 20-56254
Opinion Date: December 30, 2022
Judge: Christen
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
A police officer (Officer) in Los Angeles, shot and killed a man during a failed arrest in the men’s locker room of a gym. Before the district court, the Officer maintained that he killed the man because the man was pummeling the Officer’s partner, and the Officer feared the man’s next blow would kill her. The Officer also claimed that he yelled “stop” before shooting, but no such warning can be heard on the officers’ body-cam recordings. The man’s mother sued the Officer for his allegedly unreasonable use of deadly force. The district court denied the Officers’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, and the Officer timely appealed.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying, on summary judgment, qualified immunity to the Officer. The court held that the district court properly denied the Officer’s request for qualified immunity for two reasons. First, the district court recognized that a reasonable jury could reject the police officer’s account of the shooting because there were significant discrepancies between their versions of events and other evidence in the record. Second, the court wrote that it has long held that the Fourth Amendment requires officers to warn before using deadly force when practicable. The defense cannot argue that it was not possible for the Officer to give the man a deadly force warning because the Officer’s sworn statements show that he had time to tell Dorsey to “stop.” Therefore, the district court correctly ruled that a jury could decide that the Officer’s use of deadly force violated clearly established law.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-56254/20-56254-2022-12-30.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2022-12-31-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-3d53e36bba&utm_content=text-case-title-4
Notes: 9th Circuit Published MSJ denial decision, involving concepts, issues, etc.:
USA V. JONATHAN ANDERSON
Docket: 20-50345
Opinion Date: December 29, 2022
Judge: Per Curiam
Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Defendant was stopped for a license-plate violation, and deputies from the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department (SBCSD) discovered that he had an expired driver’s license and a long criminal history. The deputies conducted an inventory search before towing Defendant’s truck, and, after finding a handgun under the driver’s seat of his truck, arrested Defendant for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress a handgun found during an inventory search of his truck, vacated a condition of supervised release, and remanded. The panel held that the district court did not err in concluding that the government established that a valid community caretaking purpose existed for impounding and inventorying Defendant’s truck before the search was conducted. The panel wrote that the deputies had an objectively reasonable belief that Anderson’s truck, which he had parked in a private driveway, was parked illegally. The panel disagreed with Defendant’s assertion that the deputies’ inventory search was invalid because they failed to comply with the SBCSD’s standardized inventory search procedures.
The panel wrote that the inventory search was conducted pursuant to a standard policy, and was performed in good faith, not solely for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a crime; therefore, the government’s interest in the protection of property and protection of the police outweighed Defendant’s expectation of privacy in the contents of his car, and the search was reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-50345/20-50345-2022-12-29.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2022-12-30-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-7185614ed3&utm_content=text-case-read-more-2
DAVID DEMAREST V. CITY OF VALLEJO
Docket: 20-15872
Opinion Date: August 16, 2022
Judge: Collins
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging that the City of Vallejo violated the Fourth Amendment, by adding license checks to what was concededly a sobriety checkpoint. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants.
Reviewing a line of relevant Supreme Court decisions, the court derived a “two-step analysis” for assessing the validity of a checkpoint under the Fourth Amendment. Applying that two-step analysis to this case, the panel first held that because the City’s checkpoint did not have any impermissible primary purpose of advancing the general interest in crime control, it was not per se invalid. The panel then applied the factors for assessing reasonableness set forth in Lidster and concluded that the City’s systematic addition of driver’s license checks to an otherwise valid sobriety checkpoint was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The court held that, once Plaintiff refused to produce his license for examination at the checkpoint, the officer had probable cause to believe that plaintiff was committing an offense in violation of California Vehicle Code Section 12951(b), and his continued detention and arrest were therefore reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the officer’s action of physically removing Plaintiff from his car by grabbing his arm was objectively reasonable as a matter of law given Plaintiff’s lack of cooperation with her commands up to that point and the modest nature of the force used.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-15872/20-15872-2022-08-16.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2022-08-17-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-c989f25e78&utm_content=text-case-read-more-1
Notes: The 9th made a ruling on an inventory search of a vehicle and there is one point that needs your attention. The court is always looking at these types of searches and officer intent. The main point being that officers are acting in good faith and not using the search to simply obtain evidence of a crime. Basically, not abusing this type of exception to the search warrant requirement.
PRESTON SEIDNER V. JONATHAN DE VRIES
Docket: 20-17403
Opinion Date: June 30, 2022
Judge: Forrest
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Plaintiff sued Defendant officer, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when the officer used a roadblock to stop Plaintiff, who was suspected of committing a minor traffic violation, from fleeing on a bicycle. The district court construed Plaintiff’s allegations as asserting a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and found that his claim was plausible.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity Defendant. The court held that the question of whether Defendant used excessive force against Plaintiff would be a question for a factfinder. The roadblock was a use of intermediate force that was capable of inflicting significant pain and causing serious injury. Given the circumstances, a jury could conclude that Defendant should have taken additional steps to stop Plaintiff before using an intermediate level of force given Plaintiff’s minor offense and the lack of any safety risk to de Defendant or anyone else. However, even if Defendant did use excessive force, the law as it existed at the time of the incident did not clearly establish that his actions violated the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-17403/20-17403-2022-06-30.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2022-07-01-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-4cfc3ee4a8&utm_content=text-case-read-more-2
United States v. Rosenow, 33 F.4th 529 (9th Cir. 2022)
Rosenow sued FBI alleging violations of Fourth Amendment. First, Rosenow argued that the evidence discovered by Yahoo and Facebook was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment because they were acting as government agents when they searched his online accounts. Second, Rosenow argued that, even if federal law did not transform the searches performed by Yahoo and Facebook from private searches into governmental action, there still was sufficient government involvement in those searches to trigger Fourth Amendment protection. Second, Rosenow argued that, even if federal law did not transform the searches performed by Yahoo and Facebook from private searches into governmental action, there still was sufficient government involvement in those searches to trigger Fourth Amendment protection. Second, Rosenow argued that, even if federal law did not transform the searches performed by Yahoo and Facebook from private searches into governmental action, there still was sufficient government involvement in those searches to trigger Fourth Amendment protection. Finally, Rosenow argued that the subpoenas issued by the government under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) to Facebook for Rosenow’s basic subscriber and IP information were unlawful searches because they were issued without a warrant supported by probable cause. The Court disagreed with all arguments.
cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-50052/20-50052-2022-04-27.pdf?ts=1651079061
Estate of Aguirre v. County of Riverside, 29 F.4th 624 (9th Cir. 2022)
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's denial of Qualified Immunity to a Sergeant who fired 6 rounds into a suspect, killing him, Court found, thought he situation was volatile and a weapon was in play, the force used was excessive; the suspect was not attacking anybody and two of the 6 rounds entered the suspect's back, indicating the suspect was reducing his level of threat.
cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-56462/19-56462-2022-03-24.pdf?ts=1648141252
USA V. DAREN PHILLIPS
Docket: 20-10304
Opinion Date: April 29, 2022
Judge: Korman
Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Defendant’s ex-fiance discovered child pornography on his computer, which she then brought to the Sheriff’s Office. While the ex-fiance was there, the Detective asked her to show him only images that she had already viewed when she had accessed the laptop by herself. The ex-fiance complied with that request. Defendant moved to suppress on the ground that, because the Detective directed Defendant’s ex-fiance to access the computer without Defendant’s permission to show the Detective what she had already seen, the search of the computer at the sheriff’s office was an unlawful law-enforcement search.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction. The court held Defendant’s objections to the use of evidence obtained from his computer all failed. The court reasoned that because U.S. Attorney does not dispute Defendant’s assertion that his ex-fiance acted as a state agent when she accessed the computer at the sheriff’s office, the court assumed that this was a government search. However, the court applied United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), and United States v. Bowman, 215 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2000), and held that the search was permissible because, when the ex-fiance accessed the child pornography on Defendant's computer at the sheriff’s office, she merely mimicked her earlier private search.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-10304/20-10304-2022-04-29.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2022-05-02-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-82866a09b5&utm_content=text-case-read-more-3
Estate of Aguirre v. County of Riverside
Docket: 19-56462
Opinion Date: March 24, 2022
Judge: M. Margaret McKeown
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to defendant, Sergeant Dan Ponder, in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that Ponder used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he shot Clemente Najera-Aguirre six times without warning and killed him. After determining that it has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal and that Ponder did not waive his qualified immunity defense, the panel concluded that Ponder's conduct was not objectively reasonable, and his use of excessive force violated the Fourth Amendment. In this case, nothing in the record suggested that Najera was threatening bystanders or advancing toward them when he was killed. Furthermore, Najera presented no threat at all to the officer in that moment. The panel also concluded that ponder was on notice that his specific conduct was unlawful at the time.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-56462/19-56462-2022-03-24.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2022-03-25-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-323b8dbd25&utm_content=text-case-title-2
Williamson v. City of Nat'l City, 23 F.4th 1146 (9th Cir. 2022)
Opinion Date: January 24, 2022
Area of Law: Use of Force
Ninth Circuit reversed a District Court decision, granting qualified immunity to Officers. Officers repeatedly warned several individuals who were disrupting a City Counsel meeting that if they did not stop they would be arrested. The City Counsel stopped the meeting in order for police to restore peace. Individuals refused to leave and were subsequently arrested. Williamson was arrested but acted as dead weight. Two officers attempted to left her but struggled. The eventually di but one officer attempted to move Williamson through the door. Upon successful removal, Williamson claimed injury. She was cleared by medical and refused hospital transport. The following day, upon release from jail, she drove herself to the hospital and was diagnosed with a torn rotator cuff. She sued for excessive force. District Court denied qualified immunity. Ninth Circuit reversed their decision, again, granting immunity for three reasons: (1) the type and amount of force was minimal (no weapons, not taken to the ground), (2) she was repeatedly warned and the meeting ceased in order to restore peace, and (3) Williamson could have not been injured if she had simply complied.
cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-55966/20-55966-2022-01-24.pdf?ts=1643047291
Ochoa v. City of Mesa
Docket: 20-16069
Opinion Date: February 28, 2022
Judge: Consuelo Maria Callahan
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of police officers in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action brought by plaintiffs, alleging that defendants violated plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights to companionship and familial association when they shot and killed Sergio Ochoa. Reviewing the district court's decision de novo and viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the panel concluded that the district court selected the correct legal test to assess whether the conduct here shocks the conscience, and it correctly concluded that it does not. In this case, the officers did not have time to deliberate before firing and the district court correctly applied the purpose-to-harm test in order to determine if the officers' conduct shocked the conscience. The panel explained that Ochoa had engaged in a domestic dispute that allegedly involved a gun while possibly under the influence of drugs, he had entered a stranger's home stating that he was armed with knives, he failed to yield to a police car, and drove erratically. Furthermore, Ochoa ignored repeated commands from the officers, refused to drop two kitchen knives, and then took a large step. Therefore, under the purpose-to-harm test, defendants did not violate plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights. Rather, the officers' actions reflected their attempts to satisfy legitimate law enforcement objectives: apprehension of an armed, dangerous suspect and protection of the safety of the officers, the home’s inhabitants, and the public.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-16069/20-16069-2022-02-28.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2022-03-01-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-178c531238&utm_content=text-case-title-2
Tasha Williamson v. City of National City
Opinion date: January 24, 2022
9th Circuit – Resisting Arrest – Excessive Force – Protests – Council Meetings – Bane Act – Qualified Immunity
Summary: In this case a group of protestors showed up at a council meeting to protest the death of a man. They wanted to stage a “die-In” and in doing so disrupted the meeting. The mayor adjourned the meeting and officers told the protestors to leave or be arrested. The protestors agreed to engage in passive resistance by going limp and refusing. The officers then dragged them out and arrested them. One of the protestors filed this action for excessive force. She had a sprained wrist, mild swelling and a torn rotator cuff. By way of footnote the court mentioned that it was difficult to tell if the rotator cuff injury occurred during this arrest or another arrest the Plaintiff was suing over where a similar injury seemed to be a part of the claim. The court concluded that the force the officers used; i.e., lifting the limp Williamson and carrying/dragging her from the room was not more than required for the purpose. The court also concluded that the governmental interest was minimal but existed. The court recognized the right to protest but noted that protestors:
“. . . do not have a right to prevent duly installed government from performing its lawful functions. See Felarca, 891 F.3d at 818. To conclude otherwise would undermine the very idea of ordered society.”
Bottom line: no constitutional violation, so therefor district court should have granted Defendants’ motion for SJ. Also, reversed denial of SJ to Defendants under California Bane Act which requires a constitutional violation for liability to attach.
cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/01/24/20-55966.pdfTasha Williamson v. City of National City...
Miranda v. City of Casa Grande
Docket: 20-16905
Opinion Date: October 19, 2021
Judge: Daniel A. Bress
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Miranda got into an argument with his son, Matthew who was driving Miranda’s truck. Matthew stopped the truck in traffic near the family’s home. Neighbors called 911. Officers found Miranda in the driver’s seat. At the police station, Miranda admitted to having consumed six beers. He submitted to a portable breath test, which revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.137%. Officers read him a standardized “implied consent affidavit.” Miranda responded three times, “No, I will not," and was told: “If you do not expressly agree to testing ... your Arizona driving privileges will be suspended for 12 months. Officers prepared a search warrant for Miranda’s blood draw. Miranda then stated that he would do a blood draw, but the officers obtained a warrant and told Miranda, “your license is suspended.” The test revealed a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit. Miranda pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct and failure to comply with law enforcement in exchange for dismissal of the DUI. The Ninth Circuit the summary judgment rejection of Miranda’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit alleging that an officer lied during the driver’s license suspension proceeding. There is no constitutional guarantee or federal right to a driver’s license so that its deprivation does not violate substantive due process. Even assuming the officer testified falsely at the administrative hearing as to whether Miranda consented to a blood test, Arizona provided sufficient post-deprivation due process. Miranda was granted a second administrative hearing before a new ALJ, who voided the suspension. Additionally, he was pursuing a state law claim in Arizona state court.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-16905/20-16905-2021-10-19.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2021-10-20-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-40cc2fb607&utm_content=text-case-read-more-4
Sanders v. City of Pittsburg
Docket: 19-16920
Opinion Date: September 23, 2021
Judge: Patrick J. Bumatay
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
After being spotted in a stolen car, Sanders fled from the police. He led them on a car chase, then on a foot chase. An officer eventually caught up to Sanders, who continued to struggle. An officer then commanded a police dog to bite Sanders’s leg. Sanders was finally subdued and charged with resisting arrest. Sanders ultimately pled “no contest” and filed a civil rights action alleging the use of the police dog was excessive force. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his claims barred by Heck v. Humphrey, under which a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim must be dismissed if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. While a defendant cannot be convicted of resisting arrest if an officer used excessive force at the time of the acts resulting in the conviction, Sanders could not stipulate to the lawfulness of the dog bite as part of his plea and then use the same act to allege an excessive force claim under section 1983.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-16920/19-16920-2021-09-23.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2021-09-24-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-8dcb3f8aec&utm_content=text-case-read-more-3
United States v. Brown, 996 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2021)
Matter: Unlawful search
Summary: Motel employee called police about two transients on property. Two officers arrived and made contact, asking questions. The answers provided to the officers seemed inconsistent, especially given the area is known for drug sales. During conversation, Brown put his finger into his right pocket. Officers ordered Brown to stand up and turn around, then detained him with a "finger hold." Officer did not pat down Brown for weapons but rather entered his pocket directly and retrieved what he later determined to be Heroin. Brown was charged with Possession for Sales.
Brown filed a Motion to Suppress, stating (1) there was no reasonable suspicion for detention and (2) the search was unlawful per Terry v. Ohio. District Court denied the Motion to Suppress, stating the actions were reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances.
Upon conviction, Brown appealed. Ninth Circuit stated Brown's contact was consensual until the time he was ordered to stand up and turn around, at which time officers had developed reasonable suspicion. The Appellate Court did not support Brown's first claim.
Second, regarding the alleged unlawful search, the Appellate Court affirmed Brown's claims, stating that going directly into a pocket is a violation of Terry v. Ohio. Therefore, the Court held the District Court improperly denied Brown's Motion to Suppress.
Publication: cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-50250/19-50250-2021-05-12.pdf?ts=1620838994
O'Doan v. Sanford, 2021 (OUT OF RENO)
Matter: Excessive Force, etc.
Summary: Female calls 911 to report boyfriend, O'Doan, was having a seizure and breaking windows. Fire arrived and witnessed the female RP and O'Doan grappling in the roadway of a busy Reno street. Female told Fire O'Doan was having a seizure. Fire called RPD. Two officers responded, one of which saw on his MDT that Fire reported the subject was having a seizure; the second officer did not know this. Officers arrived and gave verbal commands. O'Doan, who was naked, turned and postured at the officers. One officer attempted to deploy his taser; however, it malfunctioned. Second officer used a takedown, which involved tripping the subject and guiding to the ground. A major struggle ensued. A third officer arrived to assist. Fire also assisted in attempting to detain. O'Doan was resisting and kicking. Officers succeeded in handcuffing and applied leg restraints. O'Doan suffered abrasions and a laceration. He was administered a sedative and transported to the hospital. EMS on scene, who had training in seizures, informed police they did not think O'Doan was suffering a seizure. Instead, they thought he was on a drug binge. After the hospital, O'Doan was arrested for Indecent Exposure and Resisting. The Police reports did not mention a seizure. After one night in jail, O'Doan was released on bail. Charges were dismissed several months later.
O'Doan filed a 42 U.S.C. suit alleging excessive force, a lack of PC to arrest and the deliberate fabrication of police reports which lacked any mention of seizure. He also sued the City of Reno, alleging ADA violations in that they did not make reasonable accommodations for his epilepsy.
District Court granted qualified immunity and dismissed his case. He appealed.
Ninth Circuit stated:
1) The takedown ("Reverse Reap Throw") was not excessive. This action was "reasonable".
2) District Court properly dismissed O'Doan's ADA claim that the officers should have detained him in a less forceful manner that was more appreciative of his epilepsy. Court stated he already refused to yield to verbal commands.
3) Ninth circuit agreed with District Court that there was PC for arrest. O'Doan's claim was that there was no mental intent to commit crimes, citing he was in an altered state of consciousness due to his seizure.
4) Ninth Circuit rejected the allegation that reports were fabricated simply because they did not mention "seizure" specifically. The Court could not locate any clearly established law that the officers would have violated by leaving out the initial accounts. Any officer report stated O'Doan was transported to the hospital to be "evaluated for his injuries and other possible health issues." There is no clearly established law that states the officers must provide more details. However, the Court noted that specific information regarding the seizure would be preferable.
Publication: cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-15623/19-15623-2021-03-19.pdf?ts=1616173431
Villanueva v. Cleveland, January 28, 2021
Matter: Civil Rights and Constitutional Law
Summery: The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to police officers in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when they shot and killed Pedro Villanueva and wounded Francisco Orozco, a passenger in Villanueva’s vehicle. The panel concluded, under Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989), Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007), and Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2012), that because Orozco's freedom of movement was terminated when the officers intentionally shot at the Silverado in which he was a passenger to stop its movement, Orozco was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The panel noted that it matters not whether the officers intended to shoot Orozco or whether they even knew he was present as a passenger. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the panel also concluded that a reasonable jury could conclude that the officers used excessive force, because they "lacked an objectively reasonable basis to fear for [their] own safety, as [they] could simply have stepped back [or to the side] to avoid being injured." The panel concluded that the use of deadly force was clearly established as unreasonable as of 1996 by Acosta v. City & Cnty. of S. F., 83 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 1996).
Publication: law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-55225/19-55225-2021-01-28.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2021-01-29-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-781f298f27&utm_content=text-case-read-more-3
Del Valle v. Thorne and Del Valle v. Zastrow, January, 2020
Matter: Excessive Force (as primary officers and "Integral Participants")
Summary: Court found two officers were not entitled to qualified immunity after they both used force on an individual involved in a domestic violence call. Primarily, this was because (1) the alleged crime was not serious enough and (2) it was clearly established at the time of the actions that discharging a taser on a non-threatening individual who had not committed a serious crime and had not engaged in aggressive behavior or violent resistance would violate one's Fourth Amendment.
Publication: www.llrmi.com/articles/legal_updates/2020_delvalle_v_thorne/
United States v. Lozoya, December 3, 2020
Matter: Criminal law (crimes committed on airlines)
Summary: The en banc court affirmed defendant's conviction for misdemeanor assault within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. Defendant was traveling on a commercial flight from Minneapolis to Los Angeles when she argued with another passenger and slapped him in the face. The en banc court held that venue for in-flight federal offenses is proper in the district where a plane lands. The en banc court explained that, for crimes committed on planes in flight, the Constitution does not limit venue to the district directly below the airspace where the crime was committed, and thus venue "shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed." The en banc court joined the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits and concluded that the second paragraph of 18 U.S.C. 3237(a) applies to federal crimes committed on commercial aircraft within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. Such in-flight crimes are covered by section 3237(a) and may be prosecuted in the flight's landing district.
Publication: law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/17-50336/17-50336-2020-12-03.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2020-12-04-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-e5de380a4f&utm_content=text-case-read-more-1
Wright v. Beck, December 1, 2020
Matter: Civil Rights
Summary: Civil Rights. The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, in part, that law enforcement officials violated plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when they seized and destroyed a portion of his firearms collection. Officers of the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) executed a search warrant and seized plaintiff’s collection of over 400 firearms. Plaintiff spent the next decade trying to recover the collection, asserting he owned the firearms lawfully. The LAPD voluntarily returned approximately eighty firearms, but kept the rest because, in its determination, plaintiff had not submitted sufficient proof that he owned them. While the parties were still negotiating, LAPD officer Edwards applied to the Los Angeles County Superior Court for an order granting permission to destroy the firearms, without giving plaintiff notice that he intended to seek such an order. Having obtained the order, the LAPD destroyed the firearms by smelting them. The panel held that plaintiff did not argue he was entitled to notice beyond what due process mandated, as defendants asserted. Had plaintiff abandoned the firearms and the requisite time had lapsed under California Penal Code section 34000(a), perhaps the LAPD could have applied ex parte for a destruction order without giving notice of its WRIGHT V. BECK 3 intended action. But given that plaintiff continued to assert a claim of right to the firearms and reasonably believed that the LAPD was still reviewing the documentation he provided, he was entitled to know that the LAPD intended to seek an order permitting destruction of the remaining firearms. The panel held that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that officer Edwards violated plaintiff’s due process rights. The panel had no doubt that officer Edwards had fair notice that his conduct violated plaintiff’s due process right to notice, and therefore he was not entitled to qualified immunity. The panel rejected defendants’ arguments that the district court’s judgment should be affirmed on alternative grounds, including assertions that defendants were entitled to derivative quasi-judicial immunity, that plaintiff released his property interest in the collection, and that a state order precluded the determination that plaintiff was entitled to notice. The panel affirmed, however, the district court’s conclusion that LAPD officers Aubry and Tompkins were entitled to summary judgment because there was no evidence linking them to the alleged due process violation. Because the panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, the panel also reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s failure-to-train claim brought under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which the district court characterized as derivative of plaintiff’s due process and Fourth Amendment claims. In a separate memorandum disposition, the panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on 4 WRIGHT V. BECK a defense of qualified immunity on plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim.
Publication: law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-55084/19-55084-2020-12-01.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2020-12-02-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-9b3ea2103b&utm_content=text-case-read-more-1
United States v. Ngumezi, November 20, 2020
Matter: Fourth Amendment Seizure
Summary: The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress a firearm found in a search of his car, vacated his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and remanded for further proceedings. The panel held that police officers who have reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a traffic stop—but who lack probable cause or any other particularized justification, such as a reasonable belief that the driver poses a danger—may not open the door to a vehicle and lean inside. In this case, the officer conducted an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he opened the car door and leaned into it to ask defendant for his driver's license and vehicle registration. The panel concluded that nothing about this case calls for a remedy other than the typical remedy for Fourth Amendment violation, which is the exclusion of evidence discovered as a result of that violation from criminal proceedings against defendant. Therefore, the firearm must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.
Publication: law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-10243/19-10243-2020-11-20.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2020-11-21-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-b2aa3334eb&utm_content=text-case-read-more-4
United States v. Ramirez, September 25, 2020
Matter: Fourth Amendment Seizure
Summary: The Court held that the agents' ruse in this case was not a permissible means to effect the search and seizure of Ramirez.
Case: FBI was investigating Ramirez for Child Pornography. The agents obtained a warrant to search Ramirez's residence and vehicles at the residence. When agents arrived, Ramirez and his vehicle were not present. Agents contacted Ramirez telephonically, informing him his house was burglarized and he needed to return to his residence to inventory it - a ruse. He returned and agents then executed the warrant. Agents obtained evidence from Ramirez's computers and hard drives, which were in the vehicle he used to return to the residence, and, in a 45-minute interview, he admitted to obtaining and viewing child pornography. Ramirez filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the agents unlawfully used a ruse to create the authority to seize him, his car, the evidence and his statements. The District Court denied the motion.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the agents did not seize Ramirez himself per the search warrant; the agents seized him per Michigan v Summers (reasonable to detain occupants located within the vicinity of the premises during the execution of a search warrant). Concerning ruses, the Court noted officers may use deceit in some instances, but not all ruses are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted ruses are acceptable when the ruse hides the officer's identity. In this case, however, the agent identified himself as law enforcement but then was deceitful about his purpose, i.e., the authority to access the evidence was obtained by misrepresenting the scope, nature or purpose of a government investigation. Agents "played on Ramirez's trust and reliance on their story...agents betrayed Ramirez's trust in law enforcement." Finally, Court held that the deceit employed by agents in this case violated the Fourth Amendment.
Publication: cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/18-10429/18-10429-2020-09-25.pdf?ts=1601053477
18-17404: Lam v. City of Los Banos, September 25, 2020
Matter: Qualified Immunity
Summary: The court held that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity because the second fatal shot was fired at the suspect when the suspect posed no immediate threat. Suspect stabbed the officer in the arm and the officer responded by firing the first shot and retreated. The court held that since the officer retreated after firing the first shot there was no immediate threat to grant qualified immunity for the second fatal shot.
Case: After Sonny Lam was shot and killed inside his home by a police officer, Sonny's father filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law alleging that the officer used excessive deadly force. In this case, a jury specifically found that Sonny had stabbed the officer in the forearm with a pair of scissors prior to the first shot, that the officer had retreated after firing the first shot, and that Sonny did not approach the officer with scissors before the officer fired the fatal second shot. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and held that the district court properly denied the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity as to plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim where the law was clearly established at the time of the shooting that an officer could not constitutionally kill a person who did not pose an immediate threat. Furthermore, the law was also clearly established at the time of the incident that firing a second shot at a person who had previously been aggressive, but posed no threat to the officer at the time of the second shot, would violate the victim's rights. Therefore, the facts as found by the jury adequately supported the conclusion that a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred. The panel reversed the district court's denial of the officer’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Fourteenth Amendment claim of loss of a familial relationship with Sonny, because there was insufficient evidence in the record to show that defendant acted with a purpose to harm unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement objective. The panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not commit plain error in its evidentiary rulings.
Publication: law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/18-17404/18-17404-2020-09-25.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2020-09-26-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-5bebf299d8&utm_content=text-case-title-2
19-10073: United States v. Garcia, September 10, 2020
Matter: Attenuation Doctrine
Summary: In this case the 9th Circuit looked at evidence obtained in good faith after it was held police violated the suspect's 4th Amendment. Police were found to be in violation of the 4th Amendment when they entered a home without a warrant. The Court ruled that there was not sufficient evidence to establish the emergency assistance exception to the search warrant requirement. This case is the second part of the appeal and deals with drug evidence found after detaining and handcuffing the suspect and police acting in good faith even though initial entry into home was not valid. The court struck down the good faith argument pointing to the 3 factors to consider that are listed below.
Case: Defendant again appealed his conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. In a prior appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that officers from the Salinas Police Department violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered defendant's home without a warrant, ostensibly to determine whether someone inside posed a threat to their safety or required emergency assistance. At issue in this appeal is whether, under the attenuation doctrine, the discovery of the suspicionless search condition after detaining and handcuffing defendant was an intervening circumstance that broke the causal chain between the initial unlawful entry and the discovery of the evidence supporting defendant's conviction in this case and the revocation of supervised release in the underlying case. The panel held that the evidence found in the search was not sufficiently attenuated from the constitutional violation. The panel balanced the three attenuation factors: 1) the temporal proximity between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence; 2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and 3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. The panel held that whatever role the officers' subjective good faith should play in the attenuation analysis, it is not enough to outweigh the other two factors. Under the totality of the circumstances, the panel concluded that even accepting the district court's finding that the officers acted in good faith, this fact alone is not enough to justify admission of the evidence. Therefore, the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress and the panel reversed defendant's conviction.
Publication: law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-10073/19-10073-2020-09-10.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2020-09-11-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-cab267e019&utm_content=text-case-title-3
18-35673: Andre Grimm v. City of Portland, August 21, 2020
Matter: vehicle tows.
Grimm alleged Portland's towing of Grimm's vehicle was a violation of his Due Process Rights.
Portland placed several citations and a tow notice on the car prior to towing Grimm's vehicle.
District Court found in favor of Portland.
Ninth Circuit remanded the case back to the District Court, citing "The panel first reiterated a settled principle: Due process requires that individualized notice be given before an illegally parked car is towed unless the state has a “strong justification” for not doing so." Ninth Circuit noted: "(1) Is putting citations on a car that do not explicitly warn that the car will be towed reasonably calculated to give notice of a tow to the owner?; (2) Did the red tow slip placed on plaintiff’s car shortly before the tow provide adequate notice?; and (3) Was Portland required under Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006) to provide supplemental notice if it had reason to suspect that the notice provided by leaving citations and the tow slip on Grimm’s windshield was ineffective?'
Guidance: Now need personal notice to tow a car.
Publication: cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/08/21/18-35673.pdf
18-16229: Scafidi v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, July 23, 2020
Matter: Civil Rights.
Scafidi was charged with sexual assault. During the proceedings, state courts suppressed evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant and determined that the police failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence. Charges were dismissed on the state’s motion. Scafidi brought a federal civil rights claim against the Las Vegas Metro Police Department, officers, a crime scene investigator, and the nurse who performed a sexual assault exam on the alleged victim. He contends that the officers staged an incriminating crime scene photo by moving his sleeping medications from the hotel bathroom drawer into a mint container by his clothes in the bedroom; falsely stated in a warrant application that the alleged victim’s sexual assault exam revealed sexual assault when it only revealed sexual intercourse; threatened him for asserting his constitutional rights; and made racially derogatory remarks.
The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, reasoning that Scafidi was precluded from relitigating the state justice of the peace’s determination at a preliminary hearing that there was probable cause to believe that he had committed a crime. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The district court erred by concluding that the probable cause determination precluded Scafidi from asserting in his federal suit that the defendants lacked probable cause to arrest and detain him. His allegations that the defendants fabricated evidence or undertook other wrongful conduct in bad faith created a triable issue of material fact concerning probable cause, pursuant to Nevada and Ninth Circuit precedent.
Publication: law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/18-16229/18-16229-2020-07-23.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2020-07-24-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-75eacab921&utm_content=text-case-read-more-1
19-30163: United States of America v. Nicholay P. Bocharnikov, July 27, 2020.
Matter: Criminal LAw (Fourth Amendment Violations and "follow up" investigations)
When a confession results from certain types of Fourth Amendment violations, the government must go beyond proving that the confession was voluntary—it must also show a sufficient break in events to undermine the inference that the confession was caused by the Fourth Amendment violation.
In 2017, police officers went to defendant's home after someone at his address pointed a laser at a police aircraft in flight and illegally detained defendant. The police interrogated defendant without Miranda warnings and seized the laser. Eight months later, an FBI agent approached defendant to ask follow up questions about the incident where defendant again admitted to shining the laser at the plane. After defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 39A, he moved to suppress the statements he made to the FBI agent.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the inculpatory statements he made to the FBI agent. In this case, the panel considered the temporal proximity of the search to the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct, and held that the second encounter was directly linked to the original illegalities. Therefore, defendant's statements should have been suppressed.
Conclusion: When there is accidental misbehavior by an officer, i.e., no Miranda was read when there should have been, officers "following up" must start the investigation anew. An 8-month lapse in time alone is not sufficient; the second contact must be attenuated so as to not "collapse" the 8-month passing period, such as in this case. Start fresh.
Publication: law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-30163/19-30163-2020-07-27.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2020-07-28-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-562cf54e0f&utm_content=text-case-title-2
19-10166: United States of America v. Haseeb Malik; Abdul Majid, July 6, 2020
Matter: Criminal Law (Probable Cause)
Trooper Garcia (of Ely) stopped a tractor trailer for speed. In contacting driver and passenger, he noted the odor of marijuana emitting from the cab. Driver admitted to smoking marijuana 6-7 hours earlier but stated he discarded the evidence prior to the traffic stop. Suspecting the "state crime of public marijuana consumption," the Trooper ordered both individuals out of the cab. At that time, the driver changed his timeline and admitted to smoking marijuana 4 hours prior. Note: though the defense argued that the Trooper had subjective (ulterior) motives to search, ultimately the Court stated, if ulterior motives existed, they were essentially irrelevant. In searching, Trooper located 135 pounds of cocaine and 114 pounds of methamphetamine. The District Court agreed with Malik, stating Trooper lacked sufficient evidence to search the cab and suppressed the drug evidence. The Ninth Circuit, on appeal by the government, reasoned the District Court should have considered the dishonesty as part of the reasonable belief that evidence of public marijuana consumption. Case overturned.
Publication: cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-10166/19-10166-2020-07-06.pdf?ts=1594054859
Docket: 21-15521
Opinion Date: September 16, 2024
Judge: Collins
Areas of Law: Civil Rights
The case involves a plaintiff who alleged that four law enforcement officers used excessive force during his arrest. The incident occurred on March 21, 2018, in Mesa, Arizona. The plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle that was pulled over for an unsafe traffic maneuver. During the stop, the plaintiff provided a false name and was asked to step out of the vehicle. When he did, he pushed one of the officers, leading to a struggle during which he was repeatedly punched, kicked, and tasered. The officers eventually handcuffed him using two linked sets of handcuffs. After being handcuffed, the plaintiff claimed that one officer continued to kneel on his upper back and neck, making it difficult for him to breathe.
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, concluding that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the officers' use of force was not clearly established as unlawful under existing precedent. The court also noted that one of the officers did not use any force and was focused on another individual, thus granting summary judgment on the merits for that officer.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's grant of qualified immunity for the officers concerning the force used up to the point of handcuffing, as there was no clearly established law prohibiting their actions. However, the court reversed the grant of qualified immunity for the officer who continued to kneel on the plaintiff's back and neck after he was handcuffed, finding that this conduct violated clearly established law. The court remanded the case for further proceedings regarding this officer and affirmed the summary judgment for the other officers.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-15521/21-15521-2024-09-16.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2024-09-17-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-4893d88f03&utm_content=text-case-read-more-3
Chong v. United States
Docket: 23-55140
Opinion Date: August 14, 2024
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics
A Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputy entered the curtilage of Harson Chong’s home without a warrant, leading to the discovery of drugs, guns, and money. Chong and Tac Tran, who was present at the home, were subsequently charged with federal drug and gun offenses. They claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because their attorneys did not object to the search on Fourth Amendment grounds.
The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially denied their suppression motions, ruling the search justified by the parole-search exception. However, after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Grandberry, the district court reversed, finding insufficient probable cause that Tran resided at Chong’s home. Despite this, the court upheld the search based on exigent circumstances. Chong and Tran were convicted, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. They then filed post-conviction motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied, finding no ineffective assistance of counsel.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the deputy’s entry onto the curtilage without a warrant, consent, or exigency was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court found Chong’s counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress the evidence, as the search was clearly unlawful. However, Tran lacked standing to challenge the search, as he did not reside at Chong’s home and was merely a visitor. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Chong’s § 2255 motion and remanded for relief, but affirmed the denial of Tran’s motion.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-55140/23-55140-2024-08-14.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2024-08-15-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-df24543fe0&utm_content=text-case-read-more-2
United States V. Ramirez
Docket: 22-50045
Opinion Date: April 18, 2024
Judge: Lee
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law
The case revolves around Victor Ramirez, who was pulled over by police officers for traffic violations. Recognizing Ramirez as a gang member from a previous encounter, one of the officers asked him about his parole status. Ramirez confirmed he was on parole for a firearm-related offense. During the stop, the officers discovered a loaded firearm in Ramirez's car. Ramirez was subsequently indicted for possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon.
Ramirez moved to suppress the gun and ammunition, arguing that the officers unreasonably prolonged the stop by asking about his parole status, which he claimed was unrelated to the traffic stop. The district court denied Ramirez's motion to suppress, and Ramirez pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that asking about parole status during a traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment as it reasonably relates to the officer's safety and imposes a negligible burden. The court also remanded the case in part so that the district court could correct the written judgment to conform it to the oral pronouncement of sentence.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-50045/22-50045-2024-04-18.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2024-04-19-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-00b6f4a18b&utm_content=text-case-read-more-2
USA V. PARKINS
Docket: 22-50186
Opinion Date: February 14, 2024
Judge: Owens
Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
A man named Brett Wayne Parkins was convicted of aiming a laser pointer at a police helicopter. Police officers searched Parkins's apartment without a warrant after obtaining consent from his girlfriend. Parkins, who was present but not at the doorway of his apartment, verbally objected to the search. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that under the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must be physically present and expressly refuse consent to nullify a co-tenant’s consent to a warrantless search. The court clarified that physical presence does not require the defendant to stand at the doorway — presence on the premises, including its immediate vicinity, is sufficient. The court ruled that Parkins was physically present on the premises and had expressly refused consent, so the search of his apartment violated his Fourth Amendment rights. However, the court upheld the district court's denial of Parkins's motion to suppress his pre-arrest and post-arrest statements because Parkins was not subject to interrogation for his pre-arrest statements and his post-arrest statements at the police station were not a product of the unlawful search of his apartment. The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-50186/22-50186-2024-02-14.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2024-02-15-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-71bed85d82&utm_content=text-case-read-more-2
FREDRICK WAID, ET AL V. COUNTY OF LYON, ET AL
Docket: 22-15382
Opinion Date: November 21, 2023
Judge: R. Nelson
Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Officers Timothy Wright and Brett Willey responded to a domestic violence call where they shot and killed Robert Anderson. Anderson’s estate and family sued Wright, Willey, and the County of Lyon under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Nevada law. Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted qualified immunity to the officers on the Section 1983 claims.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment excessive force claim because Plaintiffs’ rights were not clearly established. First, it was not obvious that defendants were constitutionally precluded from firing given that they were responding to an active domestic violence situation, lacked the benefit of having time to fully assess the circumstances, and needed to make split-second decisions as they were being charged. Second, Plaintiffs failed to show controlling authorities (or a consensus of persuasive ones) that would have put every reasonable officer on notice that defendants’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Distinguishing this case from other cases, the panel noted that Anderson was in a narrow hall and rapidly approaching the officers, with no barrier between them. He could have accessed the officers’ weapons at any time or otherwise harmed them. Further, if the officers took the option to retreat to the house’s entryway, they would have left Jennifer Anderson—for whom they had just called an ambulance—alone with her husband or risked injury themselves if Anderson obtained a weapon from somewhere in his home.
FREDRICK WAID, ET AL V. COUNTY OF LYON, ET AL, No. 22-15382 (9th Cir. 2023) :: Justia
BURT CAMENZIND V. CALIFORNIA EXPOSITION AND STATE FAIR, ET AL
Docket: 22-15931
Opinion Date: October 31, 2023
Judge: Sanchez
Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Officers told Plaintiff that he could distribute his tokens in designated zones, referred to as Free Speech Zones, outside the entry gates but not inside the festival itself. Plaintiff nevertheless purchased a ticket, entered the festival, began handing out tokens, and was subsequently ejected. He brought suit alleging that the Cal Expo fairgrounds, in their entirety, constitute a traditional “public forum,” analogous to a public park, thereby entitling his speech to the most robust constitutional protections.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants. The panel first held that the enclosed, ticketed portion of the fairgrounds constituted a nonpublic forum under the United States Constitution and the California Speech Clause. The space did not permit free access, its boundaries were clearly delineated by a fence, and no evidence suggested that access had previously been granted as a matter of course. The panel further noted that California courts have drawn distinctions between ticketed and unticketed portions of venues, and Plaintiff pointed to no case holding that an enclosed area with a paid-entry requirement constitutes a public forum. The panel determined that it need not decide whether the area outside the fence was a public forum under the First Amendment because the California Speech Clause provided independent support for Plaintiff’s argument that it was indeed such a forum, albeit subject to reasonable restrictions on speech. The panel concluded that the Free Speech Zones in the exterior fairgrounds were a valid regulation of the time, place, and manner of Plaintiff’s speech. The guidelines on distributing literature in the enclosed area were likewise permissible.
BURT CAMENZIND V. CALIFORNIA EXPOSITION AND STATE FAIR, ET AL, No. 22-15931 (9th Cir. 2023) :: Justia
STEPHEN HILL, ET AL V. CITY OF FOUNTAIN VALLEY, ET AL
Docket: 21-55867
Opinion Date: June 1, 2023
Judge: Lee
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
At around nine o’clock in the evening, a concerned citizen called 911 to report a Ford Mustang darting erratically in the streets. Behind the wheel was a young white male, along with a blindfolded female in the car. With the aid of the car’s license plate number provided by the caller, Fountain Valley police officers figured out the home address of the driver and raced to that house. But this was not an ongoing kidnapping. In reality, the driver was taking his wife for a “surprise” anniversary dinner. And his parents would soon experience a surprise of their own as the police officers descended upon the home that they shared with their son. Before this mix-up could be cleared, the police officers ordered the Plaintiffs out of their home for obstructing the police and pushed the father to the ground as they handcuffed him. The Hills later sued, alleging (among other things) violations of their Fourth Amendment rights against warrantless arrests and excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment for police officers.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that the police officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure when the officers ordered them to exit the home or face arrest for obstruction. The officers never seized Plaintiffs, who did not submit to the officers’ demand to leave the home. They, therefore, could not claim that they were unlawfully arrested. The panel next held that while the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for obstruction of justice, they were nevertheless shielded by qualified immunity.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-55867/21-55867-2023-06-01.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2023-06-02-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-1d09d1d5cd&utm_content=text-case-read-more-2
FRANCISCO DUARTE, ET AL V. CITY OF STOCKTON, ET AL
Docket: 21-16929
Opinion Date: February 16, 2023
Judge: Cardone
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Plaintiff pled “no contest” or “nolo contendere” to willfully resisting, obstructing, and delaying a peace officer in violation of section 148(a)(1) of the California Penal Code. Although Plaintiff entered the equivalent of a guilty plea, the state court never entered an order finding him guilty of the charge to which he pleaded. Instead, the court ordered that its acceptance of Plaintiff’s plea would be “held in abeyance,” pending his completion of ten hours of community service and obedience of all laws. After the six months of abeyance elapsed, the charges against Plaintiff were “dismissed” in the “interest of justice” on the prosecutor’s motion. Plaintiff brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court held that Plaintiff’s false arrest and excessive force claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s false arrest and municipal liability claims, as well as the district court’s adverse summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, and remanded for further proceedings. The panel held that the Heck bar does not apply in a situation where criminal charges are dismissed after entry of a plea that was held in abeyance pending the defendant’s compliance with certain conditions. The panel further held that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s municipal liability claims against the City of Stockton and Stockton Police Department. Longstanding precedent establishes that both California municipalities and police departments are “persons” amenable to suit under Section 1983.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-16929/21-16929-2023-02-16.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2023-02-17-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-e68cc0988c&utm_content=text-case-read-more-1
Notes: There is a case called Heck v. Humphrey that prohibits a civil lawsuit if there was a criminal conviction and that civil lawsuit attacks the very facts that the person was convicted of. However, as you can see from the 9th Circuit that if someone gets at defer and dismiss and they even plead to the charge it does not prohibit a civil rights action after it's been dismissed. What does this mean for you... You cannot control what the prosecution will do with their cases, but if ever asked if you are good with a defer and dismiss you need to review that case and if for some reason you had to go hands on with a suspect you can say that you do not support this type of resolution.
PAULETTE SMITH V. EDWARD AGDEPPA, ET AL
Docket: 20-56254
Opinion Date: December 30, 2022
Judge: Christen
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
A police officer (Officer) in Los Angeles, shot and killed a man during a failed arrest in the men’s locker room of a gym. Before the district court, the Officer maintained that he killed the man because the man was pummeling the Officer’s partner, and the Officer feared the man’s next blow would kill her. The Officer also claimed that he yelled “stop” before shooting, but no such warning can be heard on the officers’ body-cam recordings. The man’s mother sued the Officer for his allegedly unreasonable use of deadly force. The district court denied the Officers’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, and the Officer timely appealed.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying, on summary judgment, qualified immunity to the Officer. The court held that the district court properly denied the Officer’s request for qualified immunity for two reasons. First, the district court recognized that a reasonable jury could reject the police officer’s account of the shooting because there were significant discrepancies between their versions of events and other evidence in the record. Second, the court wrote that it has long held that the Fourth Amendment requires officers to warn before using deadly force when practicable. The defense cannot argue that it was not possible for the Officer to give the man a deadly force warning because the Officer’s sworn statements show that he had time to tell Dorsey to “stop.” Therefore, the district court correctly ruled that a jury could decide that the Officer’s use of deadly force violated clearly established law.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-56254/20-56254-2022-12-30.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2022-12-31-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-3d53e36bba&utm_content=text-case-title-4
Notes: 9th Circuit Published MSJ denial decision, involving concepts, issues, etc.:
- Officer-Involved Shooting (OIS) in a gym locker room – after 4 minute arrest attempts.
- Body worn cameras (BWCs) – 2 BWCs fell off of officers during incident.
- Partial handcuffing
- Ineffective uses of force
- Conducted energy weapon (CEW) disarm, capture
- Multiple CEW use attempts
- Failure to warn before OIS – meaning, failure to switch from CEW warning to Deadly Force (DF).
- Differences in BWC audio (after BWCs fell to the floor) and statements.
- Differences between witness and officers’ statements.
- Department findings of “unreasonable force” and policy violations.
USA V. JONATHAN ANDERSON
Docket: 20-50345
Opinion Date: December 29, 2022
Judge: Per Curiam
Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Defendant was stopped for a license-plate violation, and deputies from the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department (SBCSD) discovered that he had an expired driver’s license and a long criminal history. The deputies conducted an inventory search before towing Defendant’s truck, and, after finding a handgun under the driver’s seat of his truck, arrested Defendant for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress a handgun found during an inventory search of his truck, vacated a condition of supervised release, and remanded. The panel held that the district court did not err in concluding that the government established that a valid community caretaking purpose existed for impounding and inventorying Defendant’s truck before the search was conducted. The panel wrote that the deputies had an objectively reasonable belief that Anderson’s truck, which he had parked in a private driveway, was parked illegally. The panel disagreed with Defendant’s assertion that the deputies’ inventory search was invalid because they failed to comply with the SBCSD’s standardized inventory search procedures.
The panel wrote that the inventory search was conducted pursuant to a standard policy, and was performed in good faith, not solely for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a crime; therefore, the government’s interest in the protection of property and protection of the police outweighed Defendant’s expectation of privacy in the contents of his car, and the search was reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-50345/20-50345-2022-12-29.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2022-12-30-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-7185614ed3&utm_content=text-case-read-more-2
DAVID DEMAREST V. CITY OF VALLEJO
Docket: 20-15872
Opinion Date: August 16, 2022
Judge: Collins
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging that the City of Vallejo violated the Fourth Amendment, by adding license checks to what was concededly a sobriety checkpoint. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants.
Reviewing a line of relevant Supreme Court decisions, the court derived a “two-step analysis” for assessing the validity of a checkpoint under the Fourth Amendment. Applying that two-step analysis to this case, the panel first held that because the City’s checkpoint did not have any impermissible primary purpose of advancing the general interest in crime control, it was not per se invalid. The panel then applied the factors for assessing reasonableness set forth in Lidster and concluded that the City’s systematic addition of driver’s license checks to an otherwise valid sobriety checkpoint was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The court held that, once Plaintiff refused to produce his license for examination at the checkpoint, the officer had probable cause to believe that plaintiff was committing an offense in violation of California Vehicle Code Section 12951(b), and his continued detention and arrest were therefore reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the officer’s action of physically removing Plaintiff from his car by grabbing his arm was objectively reasonable as a matter of law given Plaintiff’s lack of cooperation with her commands up to that point and the modest nature of the force used.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-15872/20-15872-2022-08-16.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2022-08-17-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-c989f25e78&utm_content=text-case-read-more-1
Notes: The 9th made a ruling on an inventory search of a vehicle and there is one point that needs your attention. The court is always looking at these types of searches and officer intent. The main point being that officers are acting in good faith and not using the search to simply obtain evidence of a crime. Basically, not abusing this type of exception to the search warrant requirement.
PRESTON SEIDNER V. JONATHAN DE VRIES
Docket: 20-17403
Opinion Date: June 30, 2022
Judge: Forrest
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Plaintiff sued Defendant officer, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when the officer used a roadblock to stop Plaintiff, who was suspected of committing a minor traffic violation, from fleeing on a bicycle. The district court construed Plaintiff’s allegations as asserting a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and found that his claim was plausible.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity Defendant. The court held that the question of whether Defendant used excessive force against Plaintiff would be a question for a factfinder. The roadblock was a use of intermediate force that was capable of inflicting significant pain and causing serious injury. Given the circumstances, a jury could conclude that Defendant should have taken additional steps to stop Plaintiff before using an intermediate level of force given Plaintiff’s minor offense and the lack of any safety risk to de Defendant or anyone else. However, even if Defendant did use excessive force, the law as it existed at the time of the incident did not clearly establish that his actions violated the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-17403/20-17403-2022-06-30.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2022-07-01-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-4cfc3ee4a8&utm_content=text-case-read-more-2
United States v. Rosenow, 33 F.4th 529 (9th Cir. 2022)
Rosenow sued FBI alleging violations of Fourth Amendment. First, Rosenow argued that the evidence discovered by Yahoo and Facebook was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment because they were acting as government agents when they searched his online accounts. Second, Rosenow argued that, even if federal law did not transform the searches performed by Yahoo and Facebook from private searches into governmental action, there still was sufficient government involvement in those searches to trigger Fourth Amendment protection. Second, Rosenow argued that, even if federal law did not transform the searches performed by Yahoo and Facebook from private searches into governmental action, there still was sufficient government involvement in those searches to trigger Fourth Amendment protection. Second, Rosenow argued that, even if federal law did not transform the searches performed by Yahoo and Facebook from private searches into governmental action, there still was sufficient government involvement in those searches to trigger Fourth Amendment protection. Finally, Rosenow argued that the subpoenas issued by the government under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) to Facebook for Rosenow’s basic subscriber and IP information were unlawful searches because they were issued without a warrant supported by probable cause. The Court disagreed with all arguments.
cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-50052/20-50052-2022-04-27.pdf?ts=1651079061
Estate of Aguirre v. County of Riverside, 29 F.4th 624 (9th Cir. 2022)
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's denial of Qualified Immunity to a Sergeant who fired 6 rounds into a suspect, killing him, Court found, thought he situation was volatile and a weapon was in play, the force used was excessive; the suspect was not attacking anybody and two of the 6 rounds entered the suspect's back, indicating the suspect was reducing his level of threat.
cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-56462/19-56462-2022-03-24.pdf?ts=1648141252
USA V. DAREN PHILLIPS
Docket: 20-10304
Opinion Date: April 29, 2022
Judge: Korman
Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Defendant’s ex-fiance discovered child pornography on his computer, which she then brought to the Sheriff’s Office. While the ex-fiance was there, the Detective asked her to show him only images that she had already viewed when she had accessed the laptop by herself. The ex-fiance complied with that request. Defendant moved to suppress on the ground that, because the Detective directed Defendant’s ex-fiance to access the computer without Defendant’s permission to show the Detective what she had already seen, the search of the computer at the sheriff’s office was an unlawful law-enforcement search.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction. The court held Defendant’s objections to the use of evidence obtained from his computer all failed. The court reasoned that because U.S. Attorney does not dispute Defendant’s assertion that his ex-fiance acted as a state agent when she accessed the computer at the sheriff’s office, the court assumed that this was a government search. However, the court applied United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), and United States v. Bowman, 215 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2000), and held that the search was permissible because, when the ex-fiance accessed the child pornography on Defendant's computer at the sheriff’s office, she merely mimicked her earlier private search.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-10304/20-10304-2022-04-29.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2022-05-02-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-82866a09b5&utm_content=text-case-read-more-3
Estate of Aguirre v. County of Riverside
Docket: 19-56462
Opinion Date: March 24, 2022
Judge: M. Margaret McKeown
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to defendant, Sergeant Dan Ponder, in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that Ponder used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he shot Clemente Najera-Aguirre six times without warning and killed him. After determining that it has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal and that Ponder did not waive his qualified immunity defense, the panel concluded that Ponder's conduct was not objectively reasonable, and his use of excessive force violated the Fourth Amendment. In this case, nothing in the record suggested that Najera was threatening bystanders or advancing toward them when he was killed. Furthermore, Najera presented no threat at all to the officer in that moment. The panel also concluded that ponder was on notice that his specific conduct was unlawful at the time.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-56462/19-56462-2022-03-24.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2022-03-25-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-323b8dbd25&utm_content=text-case-title-2
Williamson v. City of Nat'l City, 23 F.4th 1146 (9th Cir. 2022)
Opinion Date: January 24, 2022
Area of Law: Use of Force
Ninth Circuit reversed a District Court decision, granting qualified immunity to Officers. Officers repeatedly warned several individuals who were disrupting a City Counsel meeting that if they did not stop they would be arrested. The City Counsel stopped the meeting in order for police to restore peace. Individuals refused to leave and were subsequently arrested. Williamson was arrested but acted as dead weight. Two officers attempted to left her but struggled. The eventually di but one officer attempted to move Williamson through the door. Upon successful removal, Williamson claimed injury. She was cleared by medical and refused hospital transport. The following day, upon release from jail, she drove herself to the hospital and was diagnosed with a torn rotator cuff. She sued for excessive force. District Court denied qualified immunity. Ninth Circuit reversed their decision, again, granting immunity for three reasons: (1) the type and amount of force was minimal (no weapons, not taken to the ground), (2) she was repeatedly warned and the meeting ceased in order to restore peace, and (3) Williamson could have not been injured if she had simply complied.
cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-55966/20-55966-2022-01-24.pdf?ts=1643047291
Ochoa v. City of Mesa
Docket: 20-16069
Opinion Date: February 28, 2022
Judge: Consuelo Maria Callahan
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of police officers in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action brought by plaintiffs, alleging that defendants violated plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights to companionship and familial association when they shot and killed Sergio Ochoa. Reviewing the district court's decision de novo and viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the panel concluded that the district court selected the correct legal test to assess whether the conduct here shocks the conscience, and it correctly concluded that it does not. In this case, the officers did not have time to deliberate before firing and the district court correctly applied the purpose-to-harm test in order to determine if the officers' conduct shocked the conscience. The panel explained that Ochoa had engaged in a domestic dispute that allegedly involved a gun while possibly under the influence of drugs, he had entered a stranger's home stating that he was armed with knives, he failed to yield to a police car, and drove erratically. Furthermore, Ochoa ignored repeated commands from the officers, refused to drop two kitchen knives, and then took a large step. Therefore, under the purpose-to-harm test, defendants did not violate plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights. Rather, the officers' actions reflected their attempts to satisfy legitimate law enforcement objectives: apprehension of an armed, dangerous suspect and protection of the safety of the officers, the home’s inhabitants, and the public.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-16069/20-16069-2022-02-28.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2022-03-01-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-178c531238&utm_content=text-case-title-2
Tasha Williamson v. City of National City
Opinion date: January 24, 2022
9th Circuit – Resisting Arrest – Excessive Force – Protests – Council Meetings – Bane Act – Qualified Immunity
Summary: In this case a group of protestors showed up at a council meeting to protest the death of a man. They wanted to stage a “die-In” and in doing so disrupted the meeting. The mayor adjourned the meeting and officers told the protestors to leave or be arrested. The protestors agreed to engage in passive resistance by going limp and refusing. The officers then dragged them out and arrested them. One of the protestors filed this action for excessive force. She had a sprained wrist, mild swelling and a torn rotator cuff. By way of footnote the court mentioned that it was difficult to tell if the rotator cuff injury occurred during this arrest or another arrest the Plaintiff was suing over where a similar injury seemed to be a part of the claim. The court concluded that the force the officers used; i.e., lifting the limp Williamson and carrying/dragging her from the room was not more than required for the purpose. The court also concluded that the governmental interest was minimal but existed. The court recognized the right to protest but noted that protestors:
“. . . do not have a right to prevent duly installed government from performing its lawful functions. See Felarca, 891 F.3d at 818. To conclude otherwise would undermine the very idea of ordered society.”
Bottom line: no constitutional violation, so therefor district court should have granted Defendants’ motion for SJ. Also, reversed denial of SJ to Defendants under California Bane Act which requires a constitutional violation for liability to attach.
cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/01/24/20-55966.pdfTasha Williamson v. City of National City...
Miranda v. City of Casa Grande
Docket: 20-16905
Opinion Date: October 19, 2021
Judge: Daniel A. Bress
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Miranda got into an argument with his son, Matthew who was driving Miranda’s truck. Matthew stopped the truck in traffic near the family’s home. Neighbors called 911. Officers found Miranda in the driver’s seat. At the police station, Miranda admitted to having consumed six beers. He submitted to a portable breath test, which revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.137%. Officers read him a standardized “implied consent affidavit.” Miranda responded three times, “No, I will not," and was told: “If you do not expressly agree to testing ... your Arizona driving privileges will be suspended for 12 months. Officers prepared a search warrant for Miranda’s blood draw. Miranda then stated that he would do a blood draw, but the officers obtained a warrant and told Miranda, “your license is suspended.” The test revealed a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit. Miranda pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct and failure to comply with law enforcement in exchange for dismissal of the DUI. The Ninth Circuit the summary judgment rejection of Miranda’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit alleging that an officer lied during the driver’s license suspension proceeding. There is no constitutional guarantee or federal right to a driver’s license so that its deprivation does not violate substantive due process. Even assuming the officer testified falsely at the administrative hearing as to whether Miranda consented to a blood test, Arizona provided sufficient post-deprivation due process. Miranda was granted a second administrative hearing before a new ALJ, who voided the suspension. Additionally, he was pursuing a state law claim in Arizona state court.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-16905/20-16905-2021-10-19.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2021-10-20-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-40cc2fb607&utm_content=text-case-read-more-4
Sanders v. City of Pittsburg
Docket: 19-16920
Opinion Date: September 23, 2021
Judge: Patrick J. Bumatay
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
After being spotted in a stolen car, Sanders fled from the police. He led them on a car chase, then on a foot chase. An officer eventually caught up to Sanders, who continued to struggle. An officer then commanded a police dog to bite Sanders’s leg. Sanders was finally subdued and charged with resisting arrest. Sanders ultimately pled “no contest” and filed a civil rights action alleging the use of the police dog was excessive force. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his claims barred by Heck v. Humphrey, under which a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim must be dismissed if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. While a defendant cannot be convicted of resisting arrest if an officer used excessive force at the time of the acts resulting in the conviction, Sanders could not stipulate to the lawfulness of the dog bite as part of his plea and then use the same act to allege an excessive force claim under section 1983.
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-16920/19-16920-2021-09-23.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2021-09-24-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-8dcb3f8aec&utm_content=text-case-read-more-3
United States v. Brown, 996 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2021)
Matter: Unlawful search
Summary: Motel employee called police about two transients on property. Two officers arrived and made contact, asking questions. The answers provided to the officers seemed inconsistent, especially given the area is known for drug sales. During conversation, Brown put his finger into his right pocket. Officers ordered Brown to stand up and turn around, then detained him with a "finger hold." Officer did not pat down Brown for weapons but rather entered his pocket directly and retrieved what he later determined to be Heroin. Brown was charged with Possession for Sales.
Brown filed a Motion to Suppress, stating (1) there was no reasonable suspicion for detention and (2) the search was unlawful per Terry v. Ohio. District Court denied the Motion to Suppress, stating the actions were reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances.
Upon conviction, Brown appealed. Ninth Circuit stated Brown's contact was consensual until the time he was ordered to stand up and turn around, at which time officers had developed reasonable suspicion. The Appellate Court did not support Brown's first claim.
Second, regarding the alleged unlawful search, the Appellate Court affirmed Brown's claims, stating that going directly into a pocket is a violation of Terry v. Ohio. Therefore, the Court held the District Court improperly denied Brown's Motion to Suppress.
Publication: cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-50250/19-50250-2021-05-12.pdf?ts=1620838994
O'Doan v. Sanford, 2021 (OUT OF RENO)
Matter: Excessive Force, etc.
Summary: Female calls 911 to report boyfriend, O'Doan, was having a seizure and breaking windows. Fire arrived and witnessed the female RP and O'Doan grappling in the roadway of a busy Reno street. Female told Fire O'Doan was having a seizure. Fire called RPD. Two officers responded, one of which saw on his MDT that Fire reported the subject was having a seizure; the second officer did not know this. Officers arrived and gave verbal commands. O'Doan, who was naked, turned and postured at the officers. One officer attempted to deploy his taser; however, it malfunctioned. Second officer used a takedown, which involved tripping the subject and guiding to the ground. A major struggle ensued. A third officer arrived to assist. Fire also assisted in attempting to detain. O'Doan was resisting and kicking. Officers succeeded in handcuffing and applied leg restraints. O'Doan suffered abrasions and a laceration. He was administered a sedative and transported to the hospital. EMS on scene, who had training in seizures, informed police they did not think O'Doan was suffering a seizure. Instead, they thought he was on a drug binge. After the hospital, O'Doan was arrested for Indecent Exposure and Resisting. The Police reports did not mention a seizure. After one night in jail, O'Doan was released on bail. Charges were dismissed several months later.
O'Doan filed a 42 U.S.C. suit alleging excessive force, a lack of PC to arrest and the deliberate fabrication of police reports which lacked any mention of seizure. He also sued the City of Reno, alleging ADA violations in that they did not make reasonable accommodations for his epilepsy.
District Court granted qualified immunity and dismissed his case. He appealed.
Ninth Circuit stated:
1) The takedown ("Reverse Reap Throw") was not excessive. This action was "reasonable".
2) District Court properly dismissed O'Doan's ADA claim that the officers should have detained him in a less forceful manner that was more appreciative of his epilepsy. Court stated he already refused to yield to verbal commands.
3) Ninth circuit agreed with District Court that there was PC for arrest. O'Doan's claim was that there was no mental intent to commit crimes, citing he was in an altered state of consciousness due to his seizure.
4) Ninth Circuit rejected the allegation that reports were fabricated simply because they did not mention "seizure" specifically. The Court could not locate any clearly established law that the officers would have violated by leaving out the initial accounts. Any officer report stated O'Doan was transported to the hospital to be "evaluated for his injuries and other possible health issues." There is no clearly established law that states the officers must provide more details. However, the Court noted that specific information regarding the seizure would be preferable.
Publication: cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-15623/19-15623-2021-03-19.pdf?ts=1616173431
Villanueva v. Cleveland, January 28, 2021
Matter: Civil Rights and Constitutional Law
Summery: The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to police officers in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when they shot and killed Pedro Villanueva and wounded Francisco Orozco, a passenger in Villanueva’s vehicle. The panel concluded, under Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989), Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007), and Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2012), that because Orozco's freedom of movement was terminated when the officers intentionally shot at the Silverado in which he was a passenger to stop its movement, Orozco was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The panel noted that it matters not whether the officers intended to shoot Orozco or whether they even knew he was present as a passenger. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the panel also concluded that a reasonable jury could conclude that the officers used excessive force, because they "lacked an objectively reasonable basis to fear for [their] own safety, as [they] could simply have stepped back [or to the side] to avoid being injured." The panel concluded that the use of deadly force was clearly established as unreasonable as of 1996 by Acosta v. City & Cnty. of S. F., 83 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 1996).
Publication: law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-55225/19-55225-2021-01-28.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2021-01-29-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-781f298f27&utm_content=text-case-read-more-3
Del Valle v. Thorne and Del Valle v. Zastrow, January, 2020
Matter: Excessive Force (as primary officers and "Integral Participants")
Summary: Court found two officers were not entitled to qualified immunity after they both used force on an individual involved in a domestic violence call. Primarily, this was because (1) the alleged crime was not serious enough and (2) it was clearly established at the time of the actions that discharging a taser on a non-threatening individual who had not committed a serious crime and had not engaged in aggressive behavior or violent resistance would violate one's Fourth Amendment.
Publication: www.llrmi.com/articles/legal_updates/2020_delvalle_v_thorne/
United States v. Lozoya, December 3, 2020
Matter: Criminal law (crimes committed on airlines)
Summary: The en banc court affirmed defendant's conviction for misdemeanor assault within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. Defendant was traveling on a commercial flight from Minneapolis to Los Angeles when she argued with another passenger and slapped him in the face. The en banc court held that venue for in-flight federal offenses is proper in the district where a plane lands. The en banc court explained that, for crimes committed on planes in flight, the Constitution does not limit venue to the district directly below the airspace where the crime was committed, and thus venue "shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed." The en banc court joined the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits and concluded that the second paragraph of 18 U.S.C. 3237(a) applies to federal crimes committed on commercial aircraft within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. Such in-flight crimes are covered by section 3237(a) and may be prosecuted in the flight's landing district.
Publication: law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/17-50336/17-50336-2020-12-03.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2020-12-04-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-e5de380a4f&utm_content=text-case-read-more-1
Wright v. Beck, December 1, 2020
Matter: Civil Rights
Summary: Civil Rights. The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, in part, that law enforcement officials violated plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when they seized and destroyed a portion of his firearms collection. Officers of the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) executed a search warrant and seized plaintiff’s collection of over 400 firearms. Plaintiff spent the next decade trying to recover the collection, asserting he owned the firearms lawfully. The LAPD voluntarily returned approximately eighty firearms, but kept the rest because, in its determination, plaintiff had not submitted sufficient proof that he owned them. While the parties were still negotiating, LAPD officer Edwards applied to the Los Angeles County Superior Court for an order granting permission to destroy the firearms, without giving plaintiff notice that he intended to seek such an order. Having obtained the order, the LAPD destroyed the firearms by smelting them. The panel held that plaintiff did not argue he was entitled to notice beyond what due process mandated, as defendants asserted. Had plaintiff abandoned the firearms and the requisite time had lapsed under California Penal Code section 34000(a), perhaps the LAPD could have applied ex parte for a destruction order without giving notice of its WRIGHT V. BECK 3 intended action. But given that plaintiff continued to assert a claim of right to the firearms and reasonably believed that the LAPD was still reviewing the documentation he provided, he was entitled to know that the LAPD intended to seek an order permitting destruction of the remaining firearms. The panel held that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that officer Edwards violated plaintiff’s due process rights. The panel had no doubt that officer Edwards had fair notice that his conduct violated plaintiff’s due process right to notice, and therefore he was not entitled to qualified immunity. The panel rejected defendants’ arguments that the district court’s judgment should be affirmed on alternative grounds, including assertions that defendants were entitled to derivative quasi-judicial immunity, that plaintiff released his property interest in the collection, and that a state order precluded the determination that plaintiff was entitled to notice. The panel affirmed, however, the district court’s conclusion that LAPD officers Aubry and Tompkins were entitled to summary judgment because there was no evidence linking them to the alleged due process violation. Because the panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, the panel also reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s failure-to-train claim brought under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which the district court characterized as derivative of plaintiff’s due process and Fourth Amendment claims. In a separate memorandum disposition, the panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on 4 WRIGHT V. BECK a defense of qualified immunity on plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim.
Publication: law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-55084/19-55084-2020-12-01.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2020-12-02-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-9b3ea2103b&utm_content=text-case-read-more-1
United States v. Ngumezi, November 20, 2020
Matter: Fourth Amendment Seizure
Summary: The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress a firearm found in a search of his car, vacated his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and remanded for further proceedings. The panel held that police officers who have reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a traffic stop—but who lack probable cause or any other particularized justification, such as a reasonable belief that the driver poses a danger—may not open the door to a vehicle and lean inside. In this case, the officer conducted an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he opened the car door and leaned into it to ask defendant for his driver's license and vehicle registration. The panel concluded that nothing about this case calls for a remedy other than the typical remedy for Fourth Amendment violation, which is the exclusion of evidence discovered as a result of that violation from criminal proceedings against defendant. Therefore, the firearm must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.
Publication: law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-10243/19-10243-2020-11-20.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2020-11-21-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-b2aa3334eb&utm_content=text-case-read-more-4
United States v. Ramirez, September 25, 2020
Matter: Fourth Amendment Seizure
Summary: The Court held that the agents' ruse in this case was not a permissible means to effect the search and seizure of Ramirez.
Case: FBI was investigating Ramirez for Child Pornography. The agents obtained a warrant to search Ramirez's residence and vehicles at the residence. When agents arrived, Ramirez and his vehicle were not present. Agents contacted Ramirez telephonically, informing him his house was burglarized and he needed to return to his residence to inventory it - a ruse. He returned and agents then executed the warrant. Agents obtained evidence from Ramirez's computers and hard drives, which were in the vehicle he used to return to the residence, and, in a 45-minute interview, he admitted to obtaining and viewing child pornography. Ramirez filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the agents unlawfully used a ruse to create the authority to seize him, his car, the evidence and his statements. The District Court denied the motion.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the agents did not seize Ramirez himself per the search warrant; the agents seized him per Michigan v Summers (reasonable to detain occupants located within the vicinity of the premises during the execution of a search warrant). Concerning ruses, the Court noted officers may use deceit in some instances, but not all ruses are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted ruses are acceptable when the ruse hides the officer's identity. In this case, however, the agent identified himself as law enforcement but then was deceitful about his purpose, i.e., the authority to access the evidence was obtained by misrepresenting the scope, nature or purpose of a government investigation. Agents "played on Ramirez's trust and reliance on their story...agents betrayed Ramirez's trust in law enforcement." Finally, Court held that the deceit employed by agents in this case violated the Fourth Amendment.
Publication: cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/18-10429/18-10429-2020-09-25.pdf?ts=1601053477
18-17404: Lam v. City of Los Banos, September 25, 2020
Matter: Qualified Immunity
Summary: The court held that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity because the second fatal shot was fired at the suspect when the suspect posed no immediate threat. Suspect stabbed the officer in the arm and the officer responded by firing the first shot and retreated. The court held that since the officer retreated after firing the first shot there was no immediate threat to grant qualified immunity for the second fatal shot.
Case: After Sonny Lam was shot and killed inside his home by a police officer, Sonny's father filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law alleging that the officer used excessive deadly force. In this case, a jury specifically found that Sonny had stabbed the officer in the forearm with a pair of scissors prior to the first shot, that the officer had retreated after firing the first shot, and that Sonny did not approach the officer with scissors before the officer fired the fatal second shot. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and held that the district court properly denied the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity as to plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim where the law was clearly established at the time of the shooting that an officer could not constitutionally kill a person who did not pose an immediate threat. Furthermore, the law was also clearly established at the time of the incident that firing a second shot at a person who had previously been aggressive, but posed no threat to the officer at the time of the second shot, would violate the victim's rights. Therefore, the facts as found by the jury adequately supported the conclusion that a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred. The panel reversed the district court's denial of the officer’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Fourteenth Amendment claim of loss of a familial relationship with Sonny, because there was insufficient evidence in the record to show that defendant acted with a purpose to harm unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement objective. The panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not commit plain error in its evidentiary rulings.
Publication: law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/18-17404/18-17404-2020-09-25.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2020-09-26-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-5bebf299d8&utm_content=text-case-title-2
19-10073: United States v. Garcia, September 10, 2020
Matter: Attenuation Doctrine
Summary: In this case the 9th Circuit looked at evidence obtained in good faith after it was held police violated the suspect's 4th Amendment. Police were found to be in violation of the 4th Amendment when they entered a home without a warrant. The Court ruled that there was not sufficient evidence to establish the emergency assistance exception to the search warrant requirement. This case is the second part of the appeal and deals with drug evidence found after detaining and handcuffing the suspect and police acting in good faith even though initial entry into home was not valid. The court struck down the good faith argument pointing to the 3 factors to consider that are listed below.
Case: Defendant again appealed his conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. In a prior appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that officers from the Salinas Police Department violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered defendant's home without a warrant, ostensibly to determine whether someone inside posed a threat to their safety or required emergency assistance. At issue in this appeal is whether, under the attenuation doctrine, the discovery of the suspicionless search condition after detaining and handcuffing defendant was an intervening circumstance that broke the causal chain between the initial unlawful entry and the discovery of the evidence supporting defendant's conviction in this case and the revocation of supervised release in the underlying case. The panel held that the evidence found in the search was not sufficiently attenuated from the constitutional violation. The panel balanced the three attenuation factors: 1) the temporal proximity between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence; 2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and 3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. The panel held that whatever role the officers' subjective good faith should play in the attenuation analysis, it is not enough to outweigh the other two factors. Under the totality of the circumstances, the panel concluded that even accepting the district court's finding that the officers acted in good faith, this fact alone is not enough to justify admission of the evidence. Therefore, the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress and the panel reversed defendant's conviction.
Publication: law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-10073/19-10073-2020-09-10.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2020-09-11-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-cab267e019&utm_content=text-case-title-3
18-35673: Andre Grimm v. City of Portland, August 21, 2020
Matter: vehicle tows.
Grimm alleged Portland's towing of Grimm's vehicle was a violation of his Due Process Rights.
Portland placed several citations and a tow notice on the car prior to towing Grimm's vehicle.
District Court found in favor of Portland.
Ninth Circuit remanded the case back to the District Court, citing "The panel first reiterated a settled principle: Due process requires that individualized notice be given before an illegally parked car is towed unless the state has a “strong justification” for not doing so." Ninth Circuit noted: "(1) Is putting citations on a car that do not explicitly warn that the car will be towed reasonably calculated to give notice of a tow to the owner?; (2) Did the red tow slip placed on plaintiff’s car shortly before the tow provide adequate notice?; and (3) Was Portland required under Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006) to provide supplemental notice if it had reason to suspect that the notice provided by leaving citations and the tow slip on Grimm’s windshield was ineffective?'
Guidance: Now need personal notice to tow a car.
Publication: cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/08/21/18-35673.pdf
18-16229: Scafidi v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, July 23, 2020
Matter: Civil Rights.
Scafidi was charged with sexual assault. During the proceedings, state courts suppressed evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant and determined that the police failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence. Charges were dismissed on the state’s motion. Scafidi brought a federal civil rights claim against the Las Vegas Metro Police Department, officers, a crime scene investigator, and the nurse who performed a sexual assault exam on the alleged victim. He contends that the officers staged an incriminating crime scene photo by moving his sleeping medications from the hotel bathroom drawer into a mint container by his clothes in the bedroom; falsely stated in a warrant application that the alleged victim’s sexual assault exam revealed sexual assault when it only revealed sexual intercourse; threatened him for asserting his constitutional rights; and made racially derogatory remarks.
The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, reasoning that Scafidi was precluded from relitigating the state justice of the peace’s determination at a preliminary hearing that there was probable cause to believe that he had committed a crime. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The district court erred by concluding that the probable cause determination precluded Scafidi from asserting in his federal suit that the defendants lacked probable cause to arrest and detain him. His allegations that the defendants fabricated evidence or undertook other wrongful conduct in bad faith created a triable issue of material fact concerning probable cause, pursuant to Nevada and Ninth Circuit precedent.
Publication: law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/18-16229/18-16229-2020-07-23.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2020-07-24-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-75eacab921&utm_content=text-case-read-more-1
19-30163: United States of America v. Nicholay P. Bocharnikov, July 27, 2020.
Matter: Criminal LAw (Fourth Amendment Violations and "follow up" investigations)
When a confession results from certain types of Fourth Amendment violations, the government must go beyond proving that the confession was voluntary—it must also show a sufficient break in events to undermine the inference that the confession was caused by the Fourth Amendment violation.
In 2017, police officers went to defendant's home after someone at his address pointed a laser at a police aircraft in flight and illegally detained defendant. The police interrogated defendant without Miranda warnings and seized the laser. Eight months later, an FBI agent approached defendant to ask follow up questions about the incident where defendant again admitted to shining the laser at the plane. After defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 39A, he moved to suppress the statements he made to the FBI agent.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the inculpatory statements he made to the FBI agent. In this case, the panel considered the temporal proximity of the search to the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct, and held that the second encounter was directly linked to the original illegalities. Therefore, defendant's statements should have been suppressed.
Conclusion: When there is accidental misbehavior by an officer, i.e., no Miranda was read when there should have been, officers "following up" must start the investigation anew. An 8-month lapse in time alone is not sufficient; the second contact must be attenuated so as to not "collapse" the 8-month passing period, such as in this case. Start fresh.
Publication: law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-30163/19-30163-2020-07-27.html?utm_source=summary-newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2020-07-28-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-562cf54e0f&utm_content=text-case-title-2
19-10166: United States of America v. Haseeb Malik; Abdul Majid, July 6, 2020
Matter: Criminal Law (Probable Cause)
Trooper Garcia (of Ely) stopped a tractor trailer for speed. In contacting driver and passenger, he noted the odor of marijuana emitting from the cab. Driver admitted to smoking marijuana 6-7 hours earlier but stated he discarded the evidence prior to the traffic stop. Suspecting the "state crime of public marijuana consumption," the Trooper ordered both individuals out of the cab. At that time, the driver changed his timeline and admitted to smoking marijuana 4 hours prior. Note: though the defense argued that the Trooper had subjective (ulterior) motives to search, ultimately the Court stated, if ulterior motives existed, they were essentially irrelevant. In searching, Trooper located 135 pounds of cocaine and 114 pounds of methamphetamine. The District Court agreed with Malik, stating Trooper lacked sufficient evidence to search the cab and suppressed the drug evidence. The Ninth Circuit, on appeal by the government, reasoned the District Court should have considered the dishonesty as part of the reasonable belief that evidence of public marijuana consumption. Case overturned.
Publication: cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-10166/19-10166-2020-07-06.pdf?ts=1594054859